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Security protocols are important and widely used because they enable secure commu-
nication to take place over insecure networks. Over the years numerous formal meth-
ods have been developed to assist protocol designers by analysing models of these
protocols to determine their security properties. Beyond the design stage however, de-
velopers rarely employ formal methods when implementing security protocols. This
may result in implementation flaws often leading to security breaches.
This dissertation contributes to the study of security protocol analysis by advancing
the emerging field of implementation analysis. Two tools are presented which together
translate between Java and the LySa process calculus. Elyjah translates Java implemen-
tations into formal models in LySa. In contrast, Hajyle generates Java implementations
from LySa models. These tools and the accompanying LySa verification tool perform
rapid static analysis and have been integrated into the Eclipse Development Environ-
ment. The speed of the static analysis allows these tools to be used at compile-time
without disrupting a developer’s workflow. This allows us to position this work in the
domain of practical software tools supporting working developers.
As many of these developers may be unfamiliar with modelling security protocols a
suite of tools for the LySa process calculus is also provided. These tools are designed to
make LySa models easier to understand and manipulate. Additional tools are provided
for performance modelling of security protocols. These allow both the designer and
the implementor to predict and analyse the overall time taken for a protocol run to
complete.
Elyjah was among the very first tools to provide a method of translating between
implementation and formal model, and the first to use either Java for the implemen-
tation language or LySa for the modelling language. To the best of our knowledge,
the combination of Elyjah and Hajyle represents the first and so far only system which
provides translation from both code to model and back again.
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Prolegomenon to a Thesis
The study of security protocols has never been more important. Typically such study
has focused on analysing formal specifications of security protocols ever since [22]
stated that these protocols “are the basis of security in many distributed systems, and
it is therefore essential to ensure that these protocols function correctly.” Such forms
of analysis have evolved since then and the importance of security analysis has only
grown, however it is apparent that this is only one piece of the puzzle to “ensure that
these protocols function correctly.” Beyond the security properties of a protocol, other
properties such as liveness and timely completion are also important.
Although formal methods continue to be used and developed within academia, they
are underused by the software development community as a whole. While specifica-
tions of security protocols are meticulously studied for any potential attacks, flaws can
emerge at the implementation stage. This may be due to developers working from in-
correct specifications or because of simple programming errors. Specifications often
leave out crucial information that a formal model or code fragment would not, and
trust in the developers to correctly implement their intentions. Many developers do not
have sufficient experience to be able to spot any errors they make as flaws in security
protocols are often extremely subtle. Thus we can see that some form of analysis of
the implementation is necessary. While there are general-purpose static analysis tools
that focus on applying formal methods to source code[33, 42], they typically help a
developer to create an application that will compile but does not necessarily correctly
implement the developer’s ideas. The separation of these two tasks is commonly re-
ferred to as validation and verification. Informally, validation is said to be “building the
right program” while verification is “building the program right”. Creating automated
tools for validation is hard. By focusing on a specific application domain where there
1
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are formal methods that can be applied, the validation problem becomes more akin to
verification. Here we focus on analysing security properties of security protocols.
The two options available going forward are automatically generating code based
on an analysed formal model or extracting a formal model from an implementation.
From Model to Implementation
Taking a formal model of a security protocol and converting it into a working im-
plementation is the easier direction to start with. As the model language is more
specialised than the implementation language it is easier to divine the intention of a
protocol. The downside is that once a developer takes the output of the translation they
cannot make any changes and remain certain that they are still validly representing the
model.
From Implementation to Model
It is much harder to determine the purpose of implementation code as the scope of the
language is so great. There are multiple methods of achieving the same goal with very
different syntax. However, it remains the most useful direction as analysing the imple-
mentation code allows us to be certain of the security properties of the implementation.
In this thesis we will explore methods of bridging the gap between formal models
and protocol implementations. We will present a unique two-way translation between
LySa and Java allowing translation from model to implementation and vice-versa. We
are focusing on security protocols which use cryptography to achieve security goals
such as authentication or confidential message sharing. As such, throughout this work
we interchangeably use the terms “security protocol”, “cryptographic protocol” and
“authentication protocol” to refer to this family of protocols.
1.1 Contribution Overview
The aim of this thesis is to illustrate that:
“Analysing implementations is as important as analysing models and allowing de-
velopers not versed in the details of formal methods to use these forms of analysis
improves their value.”
The specific contributions towards these aims are as follows:
• A Java API providing necessary features for implementing cryptographic proto-
cols.
• A tool which translates from an implementation using this API to a formal model
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in the LySa process calculus. This tool is named Elyjah.
• An accompanying tool named Hajyle which generates Java implementations
from a LySa model.
• A sandbox environment for LySa called LyTE which works in the Eclipse IDE[31].
• Tools for performance analysis of cryptographic protocols using the PAM frame-
work.
Figure 1.1 shows how all of these tools work together providing a cohesive suite
of tools for the generation and analysis of security protocols. The LySatool is a pre-
existing tool, full details of which can be found in [21].
Elyjah was among the very first tools to provide a method of translating between
implementation and formal model, and the first to use either Java for the source lan-
guage or LySa for the target language for the translation. To the best of our knowledge,
the combination of Elyjah and Hajyle represents the first and so far only system which
provides translation from both implementation to model and back again.
The LySa Toolkit in Eclipse has been used by students being taught LySa as part
of the Language Based Security class at the Technical University of Denmark.
1.2 Thesis Development
This work started with development on Elyjah. This name is derived from the first
and last letters of Edinburgh, where this work was undertaken, and the opening two
letters of both the source and target languages, LySa and Java. As work continued on
Elyjah it became clear it would be useful to have a method to quickly check that the
generated LySa is both valid and accurate. This directly led to the development of an
editor for LySa and a tool for summarising LySa models as protocol narrations. When
the benefit of these tools became clear it was decided to extend the functionality. Iden-
tifying teaching as a potential target use for the under development tool suite, a tool for
generating visual representations of LySa models was added. After presenting LyTE
at a conference it came to the attention of those teaching LySa at DTU who used it on
their course. While giving a guest lecture on this course, further ideas for improve-
ment were suggested, many of which were implemented in updates which were used
on the course the following year. When writing this dissertation, the LyTeX tool was
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Figure 1.1: Connectivity of Thesis
developed to allow consistent LATEX representations of LySa models in a convenient
manner.
During the development of LyTE a LySa parser was created which motivated the
development of additional LySa analysis tools that did not fit in the more general scope
of LyTE. As enquiries had already been made at conferences about the possibility of
model to code translation, and as an informal understanding of the relationship be-
tween the languages was understood from development of Elyjah this challenge was
tackled first. The resulting tool was named Hajyle as it performs the reverse translation
to Elyjah. The LySa parser was also used to provide performance analysis of crypto-
graphic protocols. This was motivated by the development of the PAM framework
allowing sophisticated analysis without creating bespoke tools.
Finally, the work presented in the formal chapter was initially motivated by com-
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ments received from reviewers and fellow participants from conferences where Elyjah
was presented. While undertaking the work however, it proved useful to provide an al-
ternative viewpoint on the work, which helped to check for bugs in Elyjah and Hajyle.
As such, it is a recommended step for those who are working on similar translation
tools and should be undertaken in parallel with tool development as both avenues in-
form the other.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
Chaper 2 provides an introduction to cryptographic primitives and the protocols that
are based around them. The LySa language is introduced along with basic examples.
Methods of analysing formal models, in particular LySa representations, of these pro-
tocols are introduced.
Chapter 3 presents a toolkit for the LySa language which has been named LyTE. This
toolkit was originally designed to help verify that the output of the Elyjah tool in Chap-
ter 5 was valid. After proving useful for this purpose and based on suggestions from
users it was expanded to provide useful functionality for those exploring LySa having
come from Elyjah or learning LySa by any other means.
This work was previously presented in [58] and for the past two years has been used
by the Language Based Security course in DTU.
Chapter 4 introduces a method for analysing the performance of cryptographic pro-
tocol models in the LySa language. An important part of security is accessibility to
information thus making it imperative that the protocol completes within a reasonable
time.
This work was previously presented in [60].
Chapter 5 presents the Java-LySa API and the Elyjah tool. The API provides a struc-
tured framework for implementing cryptographic protocols in the Java programming
language. The Elyjah tool converts such implementations into LySa so that they can
be analysed and the security properties of the implementation revealed.
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This work was previously presented in [59] and preliminary work on the topic earned
me the ScotlandIS Young Software Engineer of the Year Award in 2006.
Chapter 6 introduces the Hajyle tool. As implied by the name, this tool performs the
opposite translation to Elyjah and generates Java implementations using the Java-LySa
API from LySa models.
Chapter 7 presents a formalisation of the framework used to implement cryptographic
protocols and discusses the equivalence between JaLAPI implementations and models
expressed in LySa.
Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation by discussing both the work presented herein
and potential future work that has arisen as a result.
1.4 Prior Knowledge and Chapter Dependencies
While we have endeavoured to keep the material accessible, prior experience with an
object-based programming language such as Java is certainly advisable and knowledge
of process calculi of the π variety will help with understanding LySa examples. Al-
though the material covered in Chapter 2 is useful reading for all subsequent chapters,
Chapters 3 and 4 are independent of both each other and the material in Chapters 5, 6
and 7 which are closely related and should be read in order.
Chapter 2
Cryptographic Protocols and the
Analysis Thereof
This chapter presents the background material for the thesis. I will present a brief in-
troduction to cryptography and expand into details on cryptographic protocols and the
analysis thereof. In Section 2.5 the LySa process calculus will be introduced, defined
and explained. The following work builds upon this. The motivation for examining
implementations of protocols is presented in Section 2.8. This section gives an outline
of the objectives of the work in later chapters.
2.1 Cryptography
The science of encrypting information and the opposing struggle to break another’s
system (Cryptanalysis) has been at the heart of many conflicts both political and mili-
tary, specific examples such as the cracking of the Nazi’s Enigma machine codes con-
tributed to the end of the Second World War. Modern cryptography has its roots in the
mid 1970s when a draft of the Data Encryption Standard was published seeking feed-
back from industry experts. Another key component of cryptography was introduced
by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman called asymmetric key encryption[29]. The
publication of these advances saw an uptake in public interest and academic develop-
ment of cryptography. Although such widespread publication of techniques designed
for confidential communication may appear counter-intuitive such openness works to
minimise the flaws in these works. Publication of cryptographic advances fits with
Kerckhoff’s principle stated in 1883. This idea has been widely adopted in security
circles and states that ”There is no secrecy in the algorithm, it’s all in the key”. Sim-
7
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Figure 2.1: Basic Cryptographic Scenario
ply put this means that a system should be secure even if the enemy has access to the
algorithm’s code and knows the workings of the system.
Converting a plaintext message into one that an eavesdropper cannot understand
is known as encryption. The result of this encryption depends on the algorithm used,
the plaintext message and a further parameter referred to as a key. We represent an
encrypted message with plaintext M and a given key, K, as {M}K . Turning this un-
readable message into the original text is referred to as decryption. This process re-
quires the correct key in order to decrypt the message correctly. Two differing subsets
of cryptography are described below.
2.1.1 Symmetric Cryptography
Symmetric encryption refers to a method of encrypting data where the same key is
used for both the encryption and decryption processes. In this thesis we will be fol-
lowing the tradition of using characters Alice and Bob to demonstrate cryptographic
scenarios. In Figure 2.1 we see a typical scenario, Alice and Bob want to communicate
confidentially with each other in the presence of a third-party who can intercept their
communication. If they already share a cryptographic key, then Alice can encrypt a
message with this key, transmit the encrypted message to Bob who can then decrypt
the message using his key. As long as the third-party attacker does not know the key
and a suitably complicated encryption algorithm is used, this communication is secure.
2.1.2 Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography differs from symmetric in that different keys are used to en-
crypt and decrypt an encrypted message. This provides advantages for authentication
and key sharing. A user will generate a pair of keys, one public and the other private.
It is not possible for an attacker to derive one key if they know the other. The public
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Figure 2.2: Basic Asymmetric Communication
key can be widely distributed while the private key is kept secret. Another user can
then encrypt a message with the public key confident that the message can only be
decrypted by the accompanying private key which only the intended recipient knows.
A common analogy used to clarify the difference between these two kinds of en-
cryption is that of Alice and Bob sending padlocked boxes to each other. Under sym-
metric encryption, Alice and Bob both have keys to the same padlock. This padlock is
used by Alice to lock a box, into which she has already placed some secret information.
This box is then sent to Bob, who uses his key to unlock the padlock and read Alice’s
message. In asymmetric encryption, when Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she
must first request Bob’s padlock. She uses this padlock to lock a message inside a box,
and send the box to Bob who can then use his key to unlock his own padlock and read
the message.
In Figure 2.2 we see a basic asymmetric protocol. Alice sends Bob her public key
so that Bob can then encrypt a message to Alice with the intention that this information
is secure and authenticated. As we will see in Section 2.2 this protocol has multiple
flaws which mean neither of these goals are achieved.
2.1.3 Cryptographic Hash Function
Related to cryptography is the notion of a hash function. This can be thought of as
a one-way encryption such that knowing the resulting hash value, it is not possible
to calculate the original plaintext. More formally, given a plaintext message M and a
hash function H, it should not be possible to calculate M′ such that H(M) = H(M′).
Equally two different plaintext inputs should return different hash values, namely given
different M1 and M2, H(M1) 6= H(M2). Hash functions can be used to prove that
a principal knows a secret without revealing the secret or by providing a hash of a
message along with the message, to prove the message has not been tampered with.
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2.1.4 Specific Algorithms and Cryptanalysis
Work continues on developing more robust and secure algorithms for encryption and
hashing. The National Institute of Standards and Technology is currently halfway
through a competition [51] to choose a successor to the SHA-1 and SHA-2 hash func-
tions. These are needed as new attacks on current algorithms are constantly found [79].
Brute-force attacks themselves become more feasible with computational power be-
coming cheaper and more abundant.
In this work we will mostly ignore specifics of cryptographic algorithms and treat
encryption as a black-box such that the only way to decrypt a message is to know the
correct key.
2.2 Cryptographic Protocols
Despite advances in cryptography, encryption does not provide confidentiality. It
merely turns a mathematical decryption problem into a key-sharing problem. Most of
the time, keys are not shared by principals ahead of time so this must be accomplished
while an attacker has access to the network. As an example let us examine the basic
asymmetric cryptography scenario given in Figure 2.2. If Alice wants to allow Bob to
securely communicate with her she may provide her public key over the network. Bob
would then encrypt his message and transmit it back. However there are two attacks
that can be launched here. Firstly an attacker can easily intercept Bob’s message and
provide their own instead. As Alice’s key was sent in plaintext they can also encrypt
their message with the public key and claim to be Bob. A slightly more subtle attack
is for the attacker to intercept Alice’s public key and replace it with their own. When
Bob encrypts his message with this key only the attacker will be able to read it. To
combat such attacks we have cryptographic protocols to share keys securely as well as
accomplishing other objectives such as proving authentication of one or more parties.
A cryptographic protocol is, in this context, a series of communications between
two or more principals. A principal will usually be an independent communicating
entity, linked to other principals through some network. These communications take
place to establish one or more security related goals, or security properties. Such
properties may include:
• AUTHENTICATION Some protocols aim to establish that the principals are in-
deed who they claim to be. A typical example would be for logging in to an
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online service such as e-mail or Internet banking.
• CONFIDENTIALITY Protecting the contents of a message, such that they can
only be accessed by people with the requisite access rights.
• INTEGRITY Allowing a user to validate that the contents of a message have not
been accidentally or deliberately modified.
These days there are increased demands on security with the Internet becoming
increasingly invaluable for significant tasks such as shopping, banking and communi-
cation. With new applications such as electronic voting there is continued development
needed for new protocols.
There is a lot of interest in these protocols because, despite clever planning, flaws
can still be found in them, even though it may take years for this flaw to become known.
A flaw in a protocol means that an attacker can either glean secure information or
mislead a principal in some way that was not intended. Indeed, Ross Anderson states
in [3] that “If security engineering has a unifying theme, it is the study of security
protocols”.
2.2.1 Protocol Narration
There is a widely-used method of succinctly describing protocols, called protocol nar-
rations. A typical line of one of these narrations could be:
A → B : A, P
This line simply says, principal A sends to principal B a message containing two parts,
A’s name and a password P. This could be part of a protocol to allow A to get access to
some resource from B. If part of the message is to be encrypted, this can be represented
as follows:
B → A : B, {B, Msg}KAB
This line states that B sends a message to A consisting of its own name in plaintext and
then an encrypted block which can be decrypted using the key KAB. When decrypted
the message consists of two parts, B’s own name again and some other message. An
example of a full protocol narration is given below for the Wide Mouthed Frog proto-
col.
12 Chapter 2. Cryptographic Protocols and the Analysis Thereof
A → S : A, {B, KAB}KAS
S → B : {A, KAB}KSB
A → B : {mess}KAB
Protocol narrations of this nature have a serious limitation. This method of describing
a communication protocol only describes what messages are sent by each principal,
omitting instructions to the receiver on what action to take upon receiving each mes-
sage. Joseph E. Stoy states in [75] that “A notation is important for what it leaves out”.
Thus we may think that these typical protocol narrations must be extremely important
as they leave out most of the inner workings. Often important complexities are only
uncovered when a developer attempts to implement the protocol. Depending on the
level of their expertise they may take an easy option at this point, or worse, fail to spot
the problem.
A more accurate description of a protocol would include inputs, checks and how
encrypted message parts are decrypted. These extra assumptions need to be repre-
sented more formally for static analysis of the protocol to be possible. To get an idea
of the extra information needed to model a protocol, below is a representation of the
Wide Mouthed Frog protocol taken from [12].
1. A → : A,S,A,{B,KAB}KAS [assuming KAB is a new key]
1’. → S : xA,xS,x′A,x [check xS = S; xA = x′A]
1”. S : decrypt x as {xB,xKAB}KAS
2. S → : S,xB,{xA,xK}KSB
2’. → B : yS,yB,y [check yB = B]
2”. B : decrypt y as {yA,yK}KSB
3. A → : A,B,{m1, ...,mk}KAB
3’. → B : zA,zB,z [check zB = B; zA = yA]
3”. B : decrypt z as {z1, ...,zk}yK [yK is bound to KAB]
This additional notation now makes clear the additional work done by the receiver
of the message. The first two components of the message are the sender and then the
receiver. This convention will also be followed by messages exchanged in LySa pro-
tocols later in this thesis. The protocol above still represents three messages but the
processing of each message is broken down into three steps. The first represents the
sender’s actions; the final two steps show the receiver’s actions. The second step, repre-
sented by a prime after the message number, details the first step of work the receiver
performs upon receiving a message, namely checking certain parts of the message
match expected values as well as binding message parts to variables. The third step
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represented by a double prime details how the receiver decrypts message parts.
2.3 Attacking a Protocol
While we shall not describe every way in which a cryptographic protocol can be at-
tacked, it is worth introducing some basic attacks in order to give a sense of the diffi-
culty in creating a secure protocol.
2.3.1 Man in the Middle Attack
Figure 2.3: Man in the Middle Attack
The man in the middle attack is the name given to the first of the attacks described
in Section 2.2. The intention of the attacker is to mislead to principals into believing
they are directly talking to each other when in reality they are communicating via the
attacker. In basic scenarios under tight conditions, man in the middle attacks can be
foiled by using timestamps to ensure that the reply is received in good time.
2.3.2 Replay Attacks
Figure 2.4: Replay Attack
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A replay attack is where an attacker replays or delays a message from an earlier
run of a protocol between two legitimate principals. One example may be when Alice
asks Bob to provide her with his password which he dutifully does. Later the attacker
masquerades as Bob by repeating Bob’s password back to Alice. These attacks can be
foiled by using nonces, a protocol primitive of a random number, or to give it the full
name, a number used only once.
A more subtle use of a replay attack is where an attacker may use part of a previous
protocol in a different part of a new protocol. This is known as a type-flaw attack.
These rely on encrypted parts of the protocol having the same structure such that two
cryptographic primitives of different types may get mistaken for each other.
A similar attack is a reflection attack. Here when a valid principal attempts to
challenge an intruder to prove their identity, the attacker starts another communication
with the principal in this instance issuing the same challenge to the principal and using
their response to authenticate themselves. In essence, they trick the principal into
authenticating themselves.
2.3.3 The Dolev-Yao Attacker
The security of communication protocols is often analysed with regard to a Dolev- Yao
attacker [30]. A Dolev-Yao attacker has several abilities:
• Intercept any message sent over the network
• Decrypt any encrypted portions for which they know the correct key
• Create new messages
• Generate encrypted messages provided they have a valid key
• Send messages across the network while spoofing the sender field.
The goal of the attacker is to breach the confidentiality or integrity of the message
or foil authentication mechanisms. As well as injecting messages which an attacker
originates, it is also possible for an attacker to replay messages that it intercepts be-
tween legitimate principals and use any information passed in earlier communication
to decrypt or alter later messages.
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2.4 History of Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
Analysis of cryptographic protocols has a long history going back 20 years to BAN
Logic [22]. Cryptographic protocols continue to be a widely studied field in computer
security due to the ever increasing demand for secure communication and reliable au-
thentication. Before becoming an accepted standard, protocol models are analysed,
debated and re-proposed by security experts the world over. Even after this process and
years of use, it is not unheard of for a new flaw to be found in the protocol which under-
mines its functionality. The trouble is that while the protocols themselves are usually
concise, needing only a few messages to terminate, the flaws can be very subtle. The
most famous example of such a flaw would undoubtedly be in the Needham-Schroeder
Public Key protocol [53]. A simple attack, and fix, was presented by Gavin Lowe 17
years later [45]. Automated analysis is the most efficient method for analysing crypto-
graphic protocol models. There are numerous techniques and tools for achieving this
purpose with more devised every year [5, 37].
From the late 1970s work on modelling concurrent systems by Milner and Hoare
led to the parallel development of two process calculi, the Calculus of Communicating
Systems(CCS) and Communicating Sequential Processes(CSP). A key feature of both
of these that would lead to descendants finding use in modelling of cryptographic pro-
tocols is that interactions between parallel processes would occur via messing passing
rather than through the use of a shared memory space.
Development of these languages would lead to a variety of uses. Milner’s later
work on the π-calculus would be extended by Abadi and Gordon and lead to the Spi
calculus[1] for reasoning about cryptographic protocols. Other uses for process cal-
culus have been in the field of performance modelling with work such as PEPA [39].
Process calculi have more recently been used outside of computer science to model bi-
ological systems with key work on Stochastic π calculus [68] spawning much research
activity.
Process calculi offer several benefits for our use. As they represent the actions of
principals they are directly relatable to implementations while in other techniques such
as modal logic used by BAN Logic this relationship is less clear. This makes them
intuitively easier to understand to computer scientists who are already familiar with
programming languages. The original advantage of being able to model a concurrent
system in a concise manner by focusing only on the core actions still holds.
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2.5 LySa Process Calculus
The process calculus we shall be using to model cryptographic protocols in this thesis is
LySa [11, 12, 21]. This choice was made as LySa represents the actions of principals in
much the same way that a computer program would implement them. Additionally the
well developed, fast, efficient security analyser called the LySatool is ideally suited to
providing quick feedback to developers. As LySa was expressly designed to model the
actions of participants engaged in security-aware communication it does so succinctly
with little extraneous information. It is similar to the π-calculus [50] with some ideas
taken from the cryptographic protocol modelling Spi-calculus [1] although with two
key differences. The first crucial difference is that LySa does not use the concept of
dedicated channels to send messages. Instead LySa assumes there is a global medium
through which all principals communicate. The developers of LySa took this approach
as they believed that private channels provided a layer of privacy not matched in a real
world scenario where attackers can eavesdrop or add in messages of their own.
2.5.1 Syntax
E ::= terms
n name(n ∈ N )
x variable(x ∈ X )
m+ public key
m− private key
{E1,. . . ,Ek }E0 symmetric encryption under key E0
{|E1,. . . ,Ek|}E0 asymmetric encryption under key E0
Figure 2.5: Syntax of LySa terms
The syntax of LySa terms, E, can be found in Figure 2.5. The most basic terms
are values which are used to represent principal names, keys, nonces and encrypted
terms. Syntactically speaking these values can be broken into three subsets: names,
variables and encryption expressions. The set N has subsets for ordinary names such
as principal names, symmetric keys and nonces and a separate set for public and private
keys used to represent key pairs in asymmetric encryption. Encrypted messages are
tuples of terms encrypted under a key, E0. Both symmetric and asymmetric encryption
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can be modelled and differentiated in LySa and while syntactically the key can be any
expression, care must be taken, particularly with asymmetric encryption, to choose a
key which allows decryption to take place.
P ::= processes
〈 E1, . . . , Ek 〉 . P output
( E1 , . . . , E j ; x j+1 , . . . , xk ) . P input (with matching)
decrypt E as { E1, . . . , E j ; x j+1, . . . , xk }E0 in P symmetric decryption
(with matching)
decrypt E as {| E1, . . . , E j ; x j+1, . . . , xk|}E0 in P asymmetric decryption
(with matching)
P1 | P2 parallel composition
( ν n ) P name creation
( ν ± m ) P key pair creation
! P replication
0 termination process
Figure 2.6: Syntax of LySa processes
The syntax of processes, P, can be found in Figure 2.6. The first process models
the send portion of a synchronous communication. 〈 E1, . . . , Ek 〉 . P sends a mes-
sage of k-tuples on the global communication medium and then proceeds with process
P. Throughout this thesis we follow the convention of using the first two tuples in a
message to be the sender and receiver respectively.
( E1 , . . . , E j ; x j+1 , . . . , xk ) . P represents receiving a k-tuple message on
the global medium. The second crucial difference between LySa and Spi is that this
receive process also handles pattern-matching on the incoming message and the receipt
is successful if and only if the pattern matching succeeds. The first j parts have to
match with constants and if this is successful the remaining k− j parts are bound to
variables within the scope of the next process P.
There are two processes for decryption, one for symmetric decryption and one for
asymmetric decryption. For symmetric decryption, the key E0 must be the same as
that used to encrypt. For asymmetric decryption, it must be the accompanying key in
a key-pair. Clearly the same type of encryption must be used for both encrypting and
decrypting the message. There is no restriction placed on which key in a key pair is
used for encryption and decryption allowing LySa to be used to model both public key
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encryption and private key signatures. The pattern-matching for the receive process is
also used here.
P1 | P2 denotes two processes operating in parallel. These processes may synchro-
nise via communication or operate completely independently. ( ν n ) P creates a fresh
name which is restricted to the process P. This name could be used as a message, a
nonce or a symmetric key. ( ν ± m ) P generates two new names m+ and m− which
are used for the public and private keys of a key pair. Both names’ scope is restricted
to P. The process !P denotes an arbitrary number of copies of process P running in
parallel. 0 is the nil process which does nothing and is used as a terminator.
2.5.2 Message Part Order
In order to use pattern matching to analyse a protocol, it may be necessary to reorder
the contents of a message so that the parts that the receiver checks are all grouped
together at the start of the message. For example in the second protocol given in [53],
the third message reads
A → B: {IA, A}PKB+
However, in the LySa formal model, the recipient of the message (the principal desig-
nated as B) first checks that the message is sent by A and stores the incoming nonce
IA in a local variable. However, to do this the message needs to be reordered so that
the nonce is the second part of the message. The LySa processes for both sending and
receiving the message are as follows.
Sending Receiving
〈A, B, {|A, IA|}PKB+ 〉. (A, B; y). decrypt y as {|A; nonce|}PKB− in ...
2.5.3 Operational Semantics
The semantic reduction relation rules are given in Figure 2.7. The COM rule makes
sure that communication only succeeds when the first j values of both the input and the
output are the same. When this pattern matching succeeds the remaining k- j variables
are substituted for the remaining values from the input. The three rules for decryp-
tion: SDEC, ADEC and ASIG, all follow the same pattern matching as COM but also
ensure that the expression being decrypted is a valid encrypted expression using the
correct key. Renaming of variables in these rules and the COM rule is captured by α-
conversion which submits that the name of variables is unimportant and that terms that
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can only be distinguished by differing variable names are considered equivalent. In
this instance it states that a variable Vz is rewritten as xz in the receive or decrypted pro-
cess. Two rules NEW and ANEW allow processing of a process inside a restriction with
the provision that the restriction operator still remains. The PAR rule states that one
process may proceed without modifying the other. The final rule, CONGR formalises
that the reduction rules may be applied to any process that is structurally congruent to
the process found in the preceding rules. Full details of structural congruence can be
found in [21].
COM

















(ν n)P → (ν n)P′
ANEW
P → P′





P ≡ P′′ P′′ → P′′′ P′′′ ≡ P′
P → P′
Figure 2.7: The reduction relation P→ P′.
2.5.4 Meta-Level LySa
Development of LySa continues[13, 35] with extensions allowing analysis of more
complex scenario and attacks. The most well developed of these is a meta-level exten-
sion and the LySatool supports the analysis of it. This meta-level is used to describe
the scenario in which many instances of a principal are running. Many protocols, while
secure in some scenarios, are demonstrably less secure when more than one copy of a
principal is running concurrently. Attackers now have the option of replaying messages
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from earlier or parallel protocol sessions. In order to model this, LySa is extended with
indices to names and variables. Examples of Meta-LySa can be seen in Section 5.7.
2.5.5 Authentication
Crypto-points are a vital part of LySa’s ability to be used to analyse protocols. Without
them the LySatool would not be able to report any violations of the protocol’s au-
thentication mechanisms. A crypto-point represents a site in the protocol where either
an encryption or decryption takes place. Coupled with a crypto-point is an assertion
about the origin or destination of the encrypted message. When part of a message is
encrypted or decrypted, the developer can choose to specify the current location as a
crypto-point. Additionally, for an encryption, the developer can then choose to specify
one or more crypto-points where decryption should take place during a valid run of the
protocol. This is done like this:
[at a dest {b}]
The crypto-point for the corresponding decryption specifies where the message should
have been encrypted and is as follows:
[at b orig {a}]
The analysis performed by the LySatool is concerned with establishing the validity of
these assertions.
2.5.6 Example LySa Models
2.5.6.1 Communication
1. A→ B: msg
This is the most basic communication protocol which is worth modelling in LySa;
Alice sends a message to Bob. In the LySa model we see that there is a bit more going
on than the protocol narration describes. Firstly Alice has to generate the message that
she is going to send to Bob. In LySa, (ν msg) P restricts the scope of msg to the process
P. In this case, to Alice only. After generating a fresh message, Alice transmits the
message 〈A, B, msg〉 consisting of the name of the sender A, the intended recipient B
and the message itself.
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Bob, whose actions are modelled on the last line of the protocol, is waiting to
receive a triple. Using pattern matching, he ensures that the first two values are A and
B. If this is successful, the variable x is then bound to the value msg.
Both processes are then terminated by the nil process 0.




1. A→ B: n
2. B→ A: {n}K
This protocol sees messages being exchanged between two principals. This pro-
tocol is used to achieve authentication of principal B to principal A. The LySa model
first establishes that both Alice and Bob share knowledge of a symmetrical key K. In
this instance the scope of K is over both principals. On the other hand, the nonce n
is restricted to Alice only. Alice then sends this to Bob who then encrypts this nonce
with the shared key and sends this encrypted message back to Alice. Alice then applies
pattern matching on the decrypted message and providing the encrypted message is n
the protocol is successfully terminated.
This protocol also demonstrates basic use of crypto-points for authentication pur-
poses. There are two labels defined, one where Bob encrypts the nonce and one where
Alice decrypts it. When Bob encrypts the message he states that it should only be pos-
sible to decrypt the message by Alice, and Alice states that the only person who should
be able to encrypt the message she receives is Bob.
(ν K)((ν n)〈A,B,n〉.(B,A;y). decrypt y as {n;}K [at a orig {b}] in 0
|
(A,B;x).〈B,A,{x}K [at b dest {a}]〉.0)
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2.5.6.3 Public Key Communication
1. A→ B: K+
2. B→ A: {|msg|}K+
We return to the protocol first seen in Figure 2.2. This protocol has similarities
to the previous although we introduce asymmetric encryption. There is no shared
symmetric key so in an attempt to provide confidentiality Alice creates an asymmetric
key pair and sends the public key to Bob. The private key K− is kept private to Alice
by the scoping rules of ν. Bob then creates a new message and sends it to Alice
encrypted with the public key. Alice then decodes the message using her private key.
On successful decryption Alice has the message stored in the variable y.
(ν +- K) 〈A,B,K+〉. (B,A;x). decrypt x as {|;y|}K− [at a orig{b}] in 0
|
(A,B;k).(ν msg)〈B,A,{|msg|}k [at b dest{a}]〉 .0
2.6 Control Flow Analysis
In analysing process calculus models an extremely effective method is to use static
analysis. Dynamic testing is infeasible as it would be impractical to design test cases
to model every possible execution. Static analysis means that no execution is required
to determine properties of the code. As such analysis could potentially be undecidable,
for reasons of efficiency the analysis is typically performed on an approximation of
the program. As pictured in Figure 2.8 this approximation can either be an under or
an over-approximation. Under-approximation focuses on program behaviour that must
occur while over-approximation focuses on behaviour that may occur. This means that
under-approximation may not report all flaws while over-approximation may occasion-
ally give false positives, namely reporting a problem that does not exist. As we wish to
make guarantees as to the absence of any attacks it is better to be over-cautious. Thus
over approximation is used because it has the property that if no flaws are found then
none are present. The method of static analysis used by the LySatool is also guaran-
teed to terminate with a low polynomial running time which makes it useful as a quick
compile-time check as we desire.
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Figure 2.8: Approximation in Program Analaysis
Figure 2.9: Abstraction and concretisation between semantics and analysis
The particular type of static analysis used here is control flow analysis. This is
formalised in Flow Logic [56]. Flow Logic was introduced in the late 1990’s and has
been used for analysis of a variety of languages such as π-calculus, Spi-calculus and
λ-calculus. Control flow analysis works by collecting information about a process’
behaviour. This information is known as the analysis components. In an analysis of a
LySa model we seek to describe the communication that a protocol represents. Thus
what we need for our analysis components are two things; firstly the tuples that may
have been communicated and also the values that any variables may become bound to.
A control flow analysis does not operate on an exact set of executions but a gen-
eralisation thereof. This process is known as abstraction. Mapping the results of this
analysis back to the semantics is known as concretisation and as can be seen from
Figure 2.9 does not match perfectly with the original process. This is due to the ap-
proximation introduced earlier. Control flow analysis has been used to discover flaws
in protocols such as the Beller-Chang-Yacobi MSR protocols [6] as presented in [14].
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2.7 LySatool
The LySatool[19] is an automatic tool for checking the security properties of protocols.
The tool accepts as inputs protocols modelled in the LySa process calculus. It then
provides feedback regarding which message parts can be decrypted as well as whether
an attacker can falsely achieve authentication by inserting messages at any point. As
the analysis only represents certain aspects of a process’ behaviour this concretisation
leads to imprecision with the originally analysed process. This over approximation can
guarantee confidentiality with the downside that the tool can potentially report faults
due to attacks that are impossible to reproduce in a real world scenario. Such faults
have not yet surfaced in our practical examples, and to the best of our knowledge have
not been reported by other users of LySa.
When reporting instances where cryptography secrecy breaks down, the LySatool
uses the term ‘CPDY’ to signify a Crypto-Point in a Dolev-Yao attacker [30]. A Dolev-
Yao attacker has several capabilities namely the ability to intercept and decrypt mes-
sages for which he knows the decryption key; as well as the ability to encrypt a message
if he knows the encryption key, and finally to send messages claiming to be from a le-
gitimate principal. To represent that an attacker can decrypt an encrypted message, the
LySatool will list under the violation of authentication properties:
(a, CPDY)
Here ‘a’ is a valid crypto-point, specified by the developer of the model. Decryption
of an encrypted message is a violation of secrecy between the legitimate principals.
Additionally an attacker may be able to encrypt some message which will then be
decrypted by a principal as part of a protocol. If a legitimate principal decrypts a
message encrypted by an attacker it constitutes a violation of authentication as the
legitimate principal will believe that only another legitimate principal can encrypt this
message. This will show up as a violation represented by:
(CPDY, b)
The LySatool takes a LySa process and generates a formula in alternation-free least
fixpoint logic in clausal form(ALFP) [54]. ALFP is an extension of Horn clauses such
that it additionally allows existential and universal quantification in pre-conditions;
negated queries; disjunctions of preconditions and conjunctions of conclusions. De-
tails of the conversion from LySa to ALFP can be found in [20]. This formula is then
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Values that may not be confidential
n, {l•, Lmess}LK , n•, m•+, m•-, B, A, {l•, l•}l• [at CPDY]
Violation of authentication properties (Ψ)
No violations possible
Figure 2.10: Example LySatool Results
solved by the Succinct Solver [55]. No counter-examples or attack narrations are pro-
vided if a violation is found, as may be expected with model-checking for example,
although the faster execution speed provided with the LySatool makes up for this. The
results that the LySatool does report are provided in an HTML file presented similar to
the example in Figure 2.10.
2.8 Protocol Security and Program Security
Until recently protocol verification was completely disconnected with protocol imple-
mentations. Verification of protocol models allows a developer to be certain that a
specification of a protocol is secure, however to be of any use a developer must then
implement the model. Additionally they would have to learn the language and tools
which would allow them to analyse a formal model of their protocol. Even when work-
ing with an already validated specification it is not unheard of for errors to creep in at
the implementation stage.
Historically few applications required secure communication capability so the de-
velopment of this could be overseen by experienced experts. These days however even
most console games boast online connectivity. We cannot assume that the develop-
ment of this area is overseen by people with the necessary knowledge to avoid security
pitfalls. The risk is increased as developers are often trying to create implementations
from incomplete specifications. These often take the form of protocol narration per-
haps with supporting information although implementation details are often left out.
Such gaps are often left to developers to fill and this can lead to interoperability prob-
lems or more serious failures. Developers without experience are more likely to make
bad decisions at such points.
Additionally these days it is much easier to develop applications. The average
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developer has access to integrated development environments, managed code and au-
tomatic memory management. Added to this is access to the Internet, a huge, if not
always accurate, repository of code and help from thousand of unverified sources. In
fact, many IDEs will help write programs for you with auto-completion of keywords
and method identifiers. All of this makes it easier than ever to start writing applications.
There is also more demand for applications with mobile devices from several manu-
facturers having their own market-place where individual developers can have their
applications downloaded by thousands of people. While this explosion of developers
has many upsides, an unfortunate consequence has to be that with more developers
come more mistakes. Additionally inexperienced developers are likely to repeat mis-
takes of the past or perhaps copy code from other sources propagating any errors in
this code as in [57]. Developers face numerous pressures such as the requirement to
deliver on time and to make sure that the delivered product performs as expected. Se-
curity is often seen as an optional extra compared to these other pressures. Rarely will
a developer unfamiliar with security take the time to properly familiarise themselves
with the nuances of their task or take the time to learn a formal method that may help
them implement a secure deliverable. For these reasons, we believe that analysis of
implementations is just as important as analysis of specifications.
Chapter 3
Increasing Accessibility to Process
Calculi
In recent years, programming languages have benefited from becoming more user-
friendly. Integrated development environments (IDEs) give developers access to auto-
complete functionality, syntax checking and debugging information in an easy to un-
derstand way. In contrast, process calculi often seem to revel behind their veil of
secrecy. IDEs do have some disadvantages; they can encourage bad programming
practices and sloppy, even lazy coding due to developers being used to their IDE fixing
their mistakes. Despite this there are many advantages that users of process calculi
such as LySa could benefit from. The notion of cryptographic protocol development
assisted by an IDE’s auto-complete suggestions is worrying because inexperienced de-
velopers may choose to follow these suggestions without understanding the protocol
they are constructing. Despite this, allowing a developer to instantly check their syntax
is correct is a powerful tool and much more useful than receiving possibly confusing
syntax errors at the time of analysis. More than that, by helping inexperienced de-
velopers use such languages we encourage more people to utilise these powerful but
intimidating languages.
The LySa Toolkit in Eclipse (LyTE) was designed to help developers work with
the LySa code generated by Elyjah. It aims to make LySa slightly less intimidating to
any developers who were introduced to the process calculus through Elyjah. Like the
other tools presented in this thesis it is implemented as an Eclipse plugin so much of
the operation will be familiar to developers who should not have to learn how to use a
new tool in order to learn a new language. A screenshot of LyTE running in Eclipse is
presented in Figure 3.1. In this Eclipse configuration, LySa code is written and edited
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in the LySa Editor in the top left portion of the window, features such as the syntax
highlighting visible in the screenshot are described in Section 3.2. In the top right,
is the animation produced by the VisuaLySa as described in Section 3.4. The bottom
half of the screenshot shows the AnaLySa console and features output from both the
AnaLySa and the LySatool. More information on the AnaLySa is in Section 3.3.
Figure 3.1: The LySa Toolkit in Eclipse
3.1 LySa Parser
The following sections as well as the Hajyle tool in Chapter 6 required a custom LySa
parser. Throughout this work we used the JavaCC parser generator. However in this
tool a parser is not sufficient, a means of navigating an abstract syntax tree is also
required. JavaCC by itself will only return whether an input file is successfully parsed.
There is an add-on for JavaCC known as JJTree which allows the generated parsers to
produce syntax trees. In order to generate a parser to do this there are several stages of
computation. First a JJTree file is converted to a JavaCC file which is then converted
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Figure 3.2: Syntax Tree of decrypt x as {nonceA; msg}:Key [at a orig {b}]






JJTree defines a Java interface, Node, which all parse tree nodes must implement. This
interface provides methods for navigating through a tree of nodes using methods to
traverse to the parent as well as through the children of a node. This interface is
implemented by a SimpleNode class which is created automatically by JJTree and can
then be extended or modified as needed. Here the class was modified to increase the
error handling capabilities and change the return values of the tree traversal methods
from Node to SimpleNode to eliminate the need for casting. Using JJTree, after a
source file is parsed the root of the abstract syntax tree is returned as a SimpleNode. An
example of a LySa process represented as an abstract syntax tree is given in Figure 3.2.
We frequently have to search the source code for certain keywords or method in-
vocations. This is performed by conducting a depth-first search on a block.
p u b l i c s t a t i c vo id methodName ( SimpleNode node ){
i f ( node . t o S t r i n g ( ) . e q u a l s ( nodeName ) ) {
/ / P r o c e s s Node
} e l s e {
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < node . j j t G e t N u m C h i l d r e n ( ) ; ++ i ) {
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SimpleNode n = node . j j t G e t C h i l d ( i ) ;
i f ( n != n u l l ) {





Many of the methods that require searching an abstract syntax tree will take the form
of the above template. This method is called on the root of some block of code, such
as a single line, a method, a switch block or a whole class. The current node is then
checked to see if it contains the required string, nodeName in the above example. If
so then some additional processing will be performed, otherwise this method is called
on the children of the node. The values generated by methods of this sort are usually
stored in static ArrayList or HashMap objects allowing the original method to create
Iterator objects to iterate through these values.
3.2 LySa Editor
The LySa Editor is designed to help developers write and edit LySa models. It features
dynamic parse checking to identify errors quickly and provide the developers with a
useful error message and suggested fixes. Fitting in to the Eclipse platform, the error is
underlined, the line marked, and an error message added to the problem console. This
checking can identify syntax flaws such as using the wrong punctuation, misspelt key
words or missing pattern matching on receive and decrypt processes. Below is an ex-
ample of such checking; the keyword “decrypt” is misspelt and the error is underlined
and an error icon signifies that a problem is on this line.
The editor also provides syntax highlighting, which helps separate send, receive and
decrypt processes by highlighting them in different colours. There is additional static
analysis which checks that for each send process there is a corresponding possible
receive process with the same source and destination as well as the right number of
tuples. This is summarised below.
f i n d S e n d R e c e i v e C r y p t o P o i n t s ( SimpleNode node ) {
i f ( node == S e n d P r o c e s s )
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key = s o u r c e + ” , ” + d e s t + ” , ” + # of m s g P a r t s
v a l u e = LySa r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f S e n d P r o c e s s
send . p u t ( key , v a l u e )
i f ( node == R e c e i v e P r o c e s s )
key = s o u r c e + ” , ” + d e s t + ” , ” + # of m s g P a r t s
v a l u e = LySa r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f R e c e i v e P r o c e s s
send . p u t ( key , v a l u e )
i f ( node == EncryptTerm )
i f ( node . a t C r y p t o P o i n t != n u l l )
e n c r y p t A t . add ( node . a t C r y p t o P o i n t ) ;
i f ( node . d e s t C r y p t o P o i n t != n u l l )
i f ( node . h a s M u l t i D e s t C r y p t P o i n t ( ) ) {
f o r node . d e s t C r y p t o P o i n t C h i l d : d e s t C r y p t o P a r t
d e s t C r y p t o . add ( d e s t C r y p t o P a r t )
e l s e
d e s t C r y p t o . add ( node . d e s t C r y p t o P o i n t )
i f ( node == D e c r y p t i o n )
i f ( node . a t C r y p t o P o i n t != n u l l )
d e c r y p t A t . add ( node . a t C r y p t o P o i n t )
i f ( node . o r i g C r y p t o P o i n t != n u l l )
i f ( node . h a s M u l t i O r i g C r y p t o P o i n t )
f o r node . o r i g C r y p t o P o i n t C h i l d : o r i g C r y p t o P a r t
o r i g C r y p t o . add ( o r i g C r y p t o P a r t )
e l s e
o r i g C r y p t o . add ( node . o r i g C r y p t o P a r t )
f o r node . c h i l d : n
i f ( n != n u l l )
f i n d S e n d R e c e i v e C r y p t o P o i n t s ( n ) ;
}
Firstly the abstract syntax tree for the LySa file is searched for all send and receive
processes. When either of these are found, an entry is added to a HashMap which
has a key comprised of the source, destination and number of remaining tuples in the
message and a value of the reconstructed LySa process. Additionally when there are
encrypt terms or decryption processes various Sets are appended with the labels given
for the current location cryptopoint, with separate sets for encryption and decryption,
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and the destination or origin cryptopoint.
f i n d E r r o r s ( SimpleNode r o o t ){
f i n d S e n d R e c e i v e C r y p t o P o i n t s ( r o o t )
d e c r y p t A t 2 = d e c r y p t A t . copy ( )
e n c r y p t A t 2 = e n c r y p t A t . copy ( )
e n c r y p t A t . removeAl l ( o r i g C r y p t o )
o r i g C r y p t o . removeAl l ( e n c r y p t A t 2 )
d e c r y p t A t . removeAl l ( d e s t C r y p t o )
d e s t C r y p t o . removeAl l ( d e c r y p t A t 2 )
f o r send . keys : sendKey
i f ( ! r e c e i v e . c o n t a i n s ( sendKey ) )
r e p o r t E r r o r ( send . g e t ( sendKey ) )
f o r r e c e i v e . keys : r e c e i v e K e y
i f ( ! send . c o n t a i n s ( r e c e i v e K e y ) )
r e p o r t E r r o r ( r e c e i v e . g e t ( r e c e i v e K e y ) )
f o r e n c r y p t A t : encAt
r e p o r t E r r o r ( encAt )
f o r d e c r y p t A t : decAt
r e p o r t E r r o r ( decAt )
f o r o r i g C r y p t : o r i g
r e p o r t E r r o r ( o r i g )
f o r d e s t C r y p t o : d e s t
r e p o r t E r r o r ( d e s t )
}
Once the file has been parsed, errors are generated under certain conditions. The key
set for the send HashMap is iterated over and a check is made to make sure that there
is a corresponding key in the receive HashMap. If this is not true, an error is generated
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for the send process indicating that there is no corresponding receive process. The
same process is applied to the receive key set and any errors indicate that the receive
process has no corresponding send process.
This provides a weak form of liveness checking that warns users of possible areas
of deadlock in their models. Where this is not the case, a warning is flagged on the
send and/or receive process in question and added to the list of warnings in the Eclipse
Problems console. Below we see that processing a LySa model has identified two such
warnings. In this instance they are caused by a mismatch between a send and receive
process with an extra variable mistakenly added to the receive process in the second
warning. The reason such differences are flagged as warnings and not errors is that
there exists situations where message source or destinations use variables so a mis-
match is inevitable and should not be considered an error in this instance.
Additionally matching crypto-point labels from encryptAt and origCrypto sets and
decryptAt and destCrypto sets are removed. Any labels that remain in these sets in-
dicates a failure in the cryptopoints, with errors generated for any of the following
reasons:
• No matching decrypt crypto-point (Decrypt process lists different origin)
• No matching encrypt crypto-point (Encrypt process lists different destination)
• Specified destination crypto-point not found
• Specified origin crypto-point not found
The user’s LySa model can then be analysed with the LySatool, the results of which
are displayed in an Eclipse console. In order to best integrate the results into Eclipse, a
custom version of the LySatool has been developed. This version replaces the standard
output functionality of the LySatool which generates three HTML files. Instead, the
analysis results are output in a series of structured text files which can then be read and
parsed into Eclipse. A user can then choose which sections of the analysis they want
displayed. The three sections are:
• Violations of crypto-point assertions
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• Message parts which may not be confidential
• Tree Grammar
All three of these analysis parts reveal potential different protocol flaws. Violations of
crypto-points reveal errors where a Dolev-Yao attacker can either decrypt a message
from a principal or masquerade as a legitimate principal and construct an encrypted
message which a legitimate principal decrypts, believing it to come from another legit-
imate principal. They also reveal potential errors where two encrypted messages have
the same message format and can be swapped. When analysing Meta-LySa models,
it also reveals any assertions that do not hold within a single session revealing possi-
ble replay attacks. Rather than just the crypto-point pairs presented in Section 2.7 our
Eclipse plugin additionally provides a textual representation such as:
Unlike syntax errors or liveness checking these violations are reported in a console
used purely for LyTE purposes.
Message parts which may not be confidential reveal which message parts can be
read by a Dolev-Yao attacker. The list of these message parts are printed in the LyTE
console. A developer has the option of additionally specifying key message parts and
receiving an additional alert if they are reported as not being confidential. These key-
words are to be included in a LySa model in a comment as a comma separated list
following the phrase “keywords:”. For example if the LySa model included the line:
/* KEYWORDS:message,secret, msg */
Then if any of the message parts were reported as not being confidential, these would
be flagged with an additional error warning.
The Tree Grammar results show the mapping between variables and the values that
they become bound to during a process execution. This allows us to see when variables
are mapped to incorrect values. This analysis result is perhaps more advanced than
reporting which message parts are not confidential and the violations of crypto-point
assertions. Accordingly the protocol errors which can be identified by these results are
more subtle than those reported by the other analysis results.
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Figure 3.3: The LySa Editor Outline View in Eclipse
3.2.1 Editor Outline
Eclipse provides the opportunity to display relevant information about a file in what
is called an Outline View. This is used to provide a structured outline of the file. The
information provided is different for each editor. For example, with the standard Java
editor, the Outline View shows a hierarchy of the Java classes, methods and fields.
As LySa does not have much of a hierarchical structure beyond the separation into
principals, we decided to use the Outline View for the LySa Editor to provide pertinent
information about the protocol. The information provided is:
• Names of principals
• Names and types of keys
• Names and types of crypto-points
As can be seen in Figure 3.3, this information is presented in a structured, hierarchi-
cal system which divides keys into symmetrical and asymmetrical keys, asymmetric
keys are further divided into public and private keys. Principal names are not further
sorted although crypto-points are also divided into origin and destination sub groups.
Keys are identified only by the name of the variable used in the encryption or decryp-
tion process. We do not additionally show any aliases that may be accumulated during
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messages sent or created during ν processes. This is a conscious decision which makes
it possible to identify exactly what variable names are used for encryption and decryp-
tion. This allows a developer to make a quick check as to which variable names are
used.
3.3 AnaLySa
The AnaLySa tool translates a LySa model into a standard protocol narration. Standard
protocol narrations are often used to describe protocols, although the trouble is that
they only contain half of the protocol. Namely they do not say what the recipient does
upon receiving a message. However, they are used because they succinctly describe
the messages exchanged. Figure 3.4 shows a typical protocol narration, namely the
Otway-Rees protocol. This provides a succinct overview of the protocol and provides
a developer with quick ‘sanity check’ of a LySa model.
1. A → B : M, A, B, {A, B, M, NA}KAS
2. B → S : M, A, B, {A, B, M, NA}KAS , {A, B, M, NB}KBS
3. S → B : M, {NA, K}KAS , {NB, K}KBS
4. B → A : M, {NA, K}KAS
5. B → A : {SECRET}K
Figure 3.4: Otway-Rees protocol narration
In order to translate from a LySa model to a protocol narration such as the Otway-
Rees protocol in Table 3.1 we parse each principal in turn and pick out both the send
and receive processes. Each of these is stored in an individual queue data structure
for each principal as dramatically depicted in Figure 3.5. In this diagram we use the
syntax “→B [M, A, B, {A, B, M, NA}KAS]” to denote a message sent to principal B
which has as its contents the message parts enclosed in square brackets. The inverse
“A→ [M, A, B, y1]”syntax represents a receive process. In Figure 3.5 the processes are
colour-coded to represent the matching send and receive processes for each message.
c r e a t e Q u e u e ( P r i n c i p a l p , Node node ){
i f ( node == S e n d P r o c e s s )
queues . g e t ( p ) . addSend ( node )
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(ν KAS) (ν KBS)
(!(ν NA) 〈A,B,M,A,B,{A,B,M,NA}KAS [ at a1 dest { s1 } ] 〉
.(B,A,M;x1). decrypt x1 as {NA;xk}KAS [ at a2 orig { s3 } ] in
(B,A;x2). decrypt x2 as {;xmsg}xk [ at a3 orig { b3 } ] in 0
|
!(ν NB) (A,B,M,A,B;y1).
〈B,S,M,A,B,y1,{A,B,M,NB}KBS [ at b1 dest { s2 } ] 〉.
(ν SECRET) (S,B,M;y2,y3).
decrypt y3 as {NB;yk}KBS [ at b2 orig { s4 } ] in
〈B,A,M,y2〉.
〈B,A,{SECRET}yk [ at b3 dest { a3 } ] 〉.0
|
!(ν K) (B,S,M,A,B;z1,z2).
decrypt z1 as {A,B,M;zna}KAS [ at s1 orig { a1 } ] in
decrypt z2 as {A,B,M;znb}KBS [ at s2 orig { b1 } ] in
〈S,B,M,{zna,K}KAS [ at s3 dest { a2 } ] ,{znb,K}KBS [ at s4 dest { b2 } ] 〉.0)
Table 3.1: LySa model of Otway-Rees Encryption
a n a l y s e S e n d ( node , name )
i f ( node == R e c e i v e P r o c e s s )
queues . g e t ( p ) . addRece ive ( node )
f o r node . c h i l d : n
i f ( n != n u l l )
c r e a t e Q u e u e ( p , n ) ;
}
While creating the queues for each principal, the first process is examined to find
a send process. This will be used to construct the first message in the protocol. In
our example this is “1: A→B [M, A, B, {A, B, M, NA}KAS]”. The next task is to
identify the corresponding receive process, in this case the first process in principal B’s
queue. In other work we will then use this information to create a mapping between
the names used to refer to message parts by different principals. For the AnaLySa
tool however we are merely identifying the message order so this step is not needed.
While we know that the first message is from A to B, we need to check whether A then
immediately sends another message or themselves wait for a message from another
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A B S
→B [M, A, B, {A, B, M, NA}KAS] A→ [M, A, B, y1] B→ [M, A, B, z1, z2]
B→ [M, x1] →S [M, A, B, y1, {A, B, M, NB}KBS] →B [M, {zna, K}KAS, {znb, K}KBS]
B→ [x2] S→ [M, y2, y3]
→A [M, y2]
→A [{SECRET}yk]
Figure 3.5: Expanded Protocol
principal. To determine this we examine the second process in A’s queue. If this is
another send process then this becomes our next message. We would then repeat this,
looking at subsequent processes if they continue to be send processes. Otherwise, as
in this example, we switch to looking at the queue for the matching receive process.
Popping this message off the queue, we can then examine the next process. If there are
no other messages already sent and the protocol is not yet over then, as in this case, the
next process will be a send process. In this instance, this is a message sent to principal
S. We continue in this manner to determine the order of all messages including the two
messages that principal B sends at the conclusion of the protocol.
f o r P r i n c i p a l : p {
Queue q = neq Queue ( )
queues . add ( p , q )
c r e a t e Q u e u e ( p , p . roo tNode )
i f q . f i r s t = n e x t
f i r s t = p
}
i f ( f i r s t != n u l l ){
s o u r c e = f i r s t
d e s t = f i r s t
whi le ( t rue ) {
s o u r c e = d e s t
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i f ( queues . g e t ( s o u r c e ) . i sEmpty ( ) )
break
qp = queues . g e t ( s o u r c e ) . g e t N e x t ( )
d e s t = qp . g e t D e s t i n a t i o n ( )
i f ( queues . g e t ( d e s t ) . i sEmpty ( ) )
break
qp2 = queues . g e t ( d e s t ) . g e t N e x t ( )
p r o c e s s M e s s a g e C o n t e n t s ( qp , qp2 )
i f ( queues . g e t ( s o u r c e ) . hasNext ( ) ) {
whi le ( queues . g e t ( s o u r c e ) . g e t N e x t ( ) . i s S e n d ( ) ) {
qp = queues . g e t ( s o u r c e ) . g e t N e x t ( )
d e s t = qp . g e t D e s t i n a t i o n ( )
qp2 = queues . g e t ( d e s t ) . g e t N e x t ( )
p r o c e s s M e s s a g e C o n t e n t s ( qp , qp2 )





p r o c e s s M e s s a g e C o n t e n t s ( QueuePar t qp1 , QueuePar t qp2 ){
r e c e i v e d T o S e n d . p u t A l l ( qp1 . ge tMsgPa r t s , qp2 . g e t M s g P a r t s )
Message m = new Message ( c o u n t e r ++ , qp1 . p r i n c i p a l ,
qp2 . p r i n c i p a l , qp1 . g e t M s g P a r t s ) ;
messages . add (m)
}
Further LySatool integration within LyTE is accomplished by highlighting mes-
sage parts which appear in the list of the LySatool’s “Message Parts that may not be
Confidential”. We ignore from the analysis results any encrypted sections so if there
are any nested encryptions this won’t reveal whether an attacker will be able to read
the encrypted inner section but whether they will be able to read the base message
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Figure 3.6: AnaLySa in Action
parts. A screenshot of the AnaLySa running on the Otway-Rees protocol is shown in
Figure 3.6.
3.3.1 Elyjah/Hajyle Translation Validation
The AnaLySa can be used to act as a simple form of Translation Validation [65] for
the Elyjah tool presented in Chapter 5 and the Hajyle tool in Chapter 6. The output
from the AnaLySa can be compared with the execution trace generated by running
the JaLAPI implementation which is detailed in Section 5.3.6. Both versions of the
protocol narration should have the same structure. This acts as a case-by-case check
of the tool’s translation. It is said that there are two ways to prove the correctness of
tools like Elyjah and Hajyle, either proving the tool or proving the output. Using the
AnaLySa allows the developers to perform a simple proof of the correctness of the
LySa model in relation to the Java implementation. Figure 3.7 shows how using two
representations of a protocol we can reveal different properties that are satisfied by the
protocol. By using the LySatool on a LySa representation of the protocol we can reveal
the security properties of the protocol. Possessing a Java implementation of a protocol
we can also test for properties such as liveness, that the intended messages were indeed
shared and that parties are authenticated as intended. In Chapter 4 we continue this
by examining the performance properties of a protocol. In this figure, we see how
reducing both Java and LySa representations to a common alternative depiction allows
us to reason about the equivalency of these differing representations.
Here we present the execution trace from the Java implementation that generated
the LySa model of the Otway-Rees protocol used in Section 3.3.




















Figure 3.7: Using LyTe to validate Elyjah and Hajyle translation
INFO: 1 :A -> B: 1, A, B, {M0, M1, M2, M3}:KAS
18-Jul-2008 11:12:09 Network send
INFO: 2 :B -> S: 1, A, B, 124AFog5PqCr/HCsdZ/5Jg==,
{M0, M1, M2, M3}:KBS
18-Jul-2008 11:12:09 Network send
INFO: 3 :S -> B: 1, {M0, M1}:KAS, {M0, M1}:KBS
18-Jul-2008 11:12:09 Network send
INFO: 4 :B -> A: 1, qirLTAOPhn5FmkkY70GBtN8rIUSLgJCf
18-Jul-2008 11:12:09 Network send
INFO: 5 :B -> A: {M0}:yk
Comparing the two different protocol narrations reveals the same structure thus pro-
viding evidence of correct translation for this example. However, there are a few key
differences. Firstly the serial number, M in the AnaLySa result, is replaced with the ac-
tual number in the execution trace. Use of encryption results in two further differences,
firstly the execution trace only contains the structure of the encrypted section and sec-
ondly the fourth tuple in the second message and the second tuple in the penultimate
message are the encrypted string rather than the variable names used to identify them.
This system has a couple of limitations. Firstly as we are comparing standard protocol
narrations we are only checking that the messages that are sent are the same. There
42 Chapter 3. Increasing Accessibility to Process Calculi
Figure 3.8: VisuaLySa Sequence Diagram
are no guarantees that the message is processed the same way in the LySa version as in
the original implementation. Further work on this tool could correct this shortcoming.
At the moment however, we believe it provides a useful reassurance to developers that
Elyjah or Hajyle is correctly translating their protocol representation.
3.4 VisuaLySa
As an alternative to the protocol narration provided by the AnaLySa, we additionally
present graphical representations of LySa models. This option is useful as a teaching
tool for explaining cryptographic protocols to people unfamiliar with them, and beyond
this audience to developers who are starting to use LySa and while still getting used to
the syntax, want to learn through experimentation. The VisuaLySa provided by LyTE
offers two forms of outputs. The first is a sequence-diagram style picture as seen in
Figure 3.8. This is a simple pictorial depiction of a protocol but distinctly shows the
messages sent in the correct order and we easily see the flow of information during the
protocol. For teaching purposes, the diagram can be generated one message at a time
to enable explanation of complicated protocols and at any point the diagram can be
exported for inclusion in lecture notes or other publications.
A more interactive and intuitive view is also provided as a protocol animation.
This view simulates the protocol narrations given earlier in this thesis such as in Sec-
tion 2.5.6. On initiation of the VisuaLySa, the correct number of principals is gener-
ated. The user then has the option of stepping through the protocol one message at
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a time or viewing the protocol in its entirety. Messages move across the screen from
one principal to another and accumulate over a protocol run to give a lasting protocol
narration. LySatool integration is provided by the depiction of a Dolev-Yao attacker.
This provides a user with a way of seeing the attacker’s knowledge accumulating over
the length of a protocol. Crypto-point assertion violations are also represented as part
of the animation. Messages that can be decrypted are shown as an additional message
sent from the sender to the attacker. Any encrypted portions that can be forged by the
attacker are depicted as a message moving from the attacker to the intended recipient.
After a protocol run has been exhausted, the picture shows the messages that have been
received by each principal and also displays which communication links between prin-
cipals have been utilised. The user also has several options for controlling the speed
of the animation. There is a user-adjustable slider to control the speed of the mes-
sage movement. There is an additional option to stop the message halfway between
principals.
These stages are depicted in Figure 3.10. In the first picture a message is being sent
from principal B to principal A. Although the motion that is present in the animation
cannot be easily depicted the link between the two principals is an arrow showing the
direction of information flow. This is in fact the final message in the Otway-Rees
protocol and as such the attacker has accumulated an extensive amount of knowledge,
all from merely observing the information sent across the network. The second picture
shows the situation after the message has arrived at A. The attacker now also has
knowledge of the encrypted secret but does not have the ability to decrypt it and learn
the secret. The final picture shows a succinct pictorial summary of the protocol. We
can see from this that principals A and S never directly communicate.
In order to demonstrate what happens when a protocol goes wrong we introduce
an error into the protocol. In the fourth message we mistakenly send yk instead of
y2 to principal A. Figure 3.9 shows a message originating from B toward the attacker
revealing that the attacker can decrypt the message. There is an additional message
from the attacker towards principal A denoting that the attacker can create an encrypted
message which A believes to be from B and successfully decrypts it.
3.5 LyTeX
Another feature included in the LySa Toolkit in Eclipse is called LyTeX. This tool
converts a LySa model into a typeset model suitable for inclusion in a LATEX document.
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Figure 3.9: VisuaLySa Animation with attacker
All the LySa models in this thesis were generated using this tool having been written
in the LySa Editor which was used to check the syntax of these models prior to their
inclusion in this thesis.
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While security and privacy are looked upon as fundamental rights, the speed at which
messages are delivered must also be viewed as a critical matter. Noted security expert
Bruce Schneier repeatedly states in [71] that “Security is a trade-off”. While people
are willing to wait or undertake extra work for security, there are limits to how long
they will do so. There are multiple methods for analysing the security properties of
cryptographic protocols[22, 1, 10] and equally many methods of analysing the perfor-
mance of computer systems[16, 39, 2]. In this section we explore merging the two
fields by developing tools to analyse the run-time performance of a cryptographic pro-
tocol. It is a worthwhile goal to determine if in individual scenarios a balance can be
determined for these two competing properties of a protocol. We do not discuss us-
ing these techniques to find potential security issues such as identifying stale keys or
denial of service attacks although further work could potentially expand on the tools
presented here to accomplish such goals.
In this chapter we present a way to leverage existing analytic techniques developed
for the PEPA calculus. In Section 4.1 we describe the new representation used to allow
performance modelling and in Section 4.2 we detail the process to convert LySa models
into this new format. In Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 we present two tools which allow
us to visualise and improve our performance model and in Section 4.6 we show the
sort of analysis that can be performed on these models. The relationship between the
various tools and file formats that this section deals with is detailed in the following
diagram.
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PAM, Process Algebra Modelling, is a framework for representing process calculi as
labelled continuous-time Markov chains and analysing them using analysers developed
for the PEPA calculus[39]. PAM allows stakeholders in Markovian process calculi to
generate the underlying labelled transition system from their favourite Markovian pro-
cess calculus and then pass this transition system to the PEPA Eclipse Plug-in for solu-
tion and visualisation of the results. The PAM language represents transition systems
using XML allowing the structure of the transition system to be easily represented.
This work is part of the PEPA Eclipse plug-in as featured in papers such as [78].
We present PAMeLa, short for PAM-ersatz-LySa, an Eclipse plug-in which trans-
lates LySa models into PAM files which we can then analyse. The translation process
between LySa and PAM is straightforward for simple protocols but as the protocols get
larger subtleties are discovered. A PAM file contains a series of states which can have
several transitions. A transition is a description of the resulting state along with a label
and rate for the transition from the original to the new state. For our use, a state is a
composition with each process representing a principal in a protocol. As cryptographic
protocols do not typically have a notion of choice the transitions in a single process are
linear. There is some work to be done with automatically unrolling multiple and nested
encryption. Additionally, although there is no choice in a single principal there is some
option in the transitions. The excerpt below is taken from the PAM representation of
the Otway-Rees protocol. In this example, either the first or second process can tran-
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sition to a new state, although the third is waiting for an accompanying send process


























The current stage of the protocol this excerpt represents is emphasised in Table 4.1.
The full state space diagram can be seen in Figure 4.1. These diagrams can be
automatically generated by the PAMeLa Eclipse plug-in, although this one has been
hand drawn in an attempt to provide readability. The diagram demonstrates that while
each principal is a linear system, there are several areas where different principals can
advance at different speeds before meeting up on shared transitions.
50 Chapter 4. Concerning Performance Driven Cryptographic Protocol Development
(ν KAS) (ν KBS)
(!(ν NA) 〈A,B,M,A,B,{A,B,M,NA}KAS [ at a1 dest { s1 } ] 〉.
(B,A,M;x1). decrypt x1 as {NA;xk}KAS [ at a2 orig { s3 } ] in
(B,A;x2). decrypt x2 as {;xmsg}xk [ at a3 orig { b3 } ] in 0
|
!(ν NB) (A,B,M,A,B;y1).
〈B,S,M,A,B,y1,{A,B,M,NB}KBS [ at b1 dest { s2 } ] 〉.
(ν SECRET) (S,B,M;y2,y3).
decrypt y3 as {NB;yk}KBS [ at b2 orig { s4 } ] in
〈B,A,M,y2〉.〈B,A,{SECRET}yk [ at b3 dest { a3 } ] 〉.0
|
!(ν K) (B,S,M,A,B;z1,z2).
decrypt z1 as {A,B,M;zna}KAS [ at s1 orig { a1 } ] in
decrypt z2 as {A,B,M;znb}KBS [ at s2 orig { b1 } ] in
〈S,B,M,{zna,K}KAS [at s3 dest {a2}], {znb,K}KBS [at s4 dest {b2}] 〉.0)
Table 4.1: LySa model of Otway-Rees Encryption
Different rates are generated for encryption, decryption, message generation and
communication for each separate principal and link between them. Using the PEPA
Eclipse Plug-in we can then determine if the protocol is suitable for the intended de-
ployment scenario and if we were determined to improve one part of the infrastructure
which part it should be. In cases such as the above Otway-Rees protocol, preconditions
on the protocol such as the shared keys KAS, KBS are not included in the PAM model
as we are attempting to represent a typical protocol run and such pre-conditions would
only occur once.
4.2 LySa to PAM
We use the same parser we developed for the LySa Toolkit in Eclipse introduced in
Section 3.1. The first task is to identify all the keys used in the protocol. This is per-
formed by examining all encrypt and decrypt processes and storing the name of the
variable used as a key in the process along with the type of encryption used, symmet-
rical or asymmetrical. This process is similar to the findSendReceiveCryptoPoints
method defined in Section 3.2. We must then find all additional names that these vari-
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Figure 4.1: State Space Diagram of the Otway-Rees protocol
ables are known by in other principals. We do this by matching the send and receive
processes of messages as in Section 3.3. We can then create a mapping between the
variable names which are used in a receive statement with the names used in the cor-
responding send process.
f i n d A l l K e y s ( ) {
f i n d K e y s ( r o o t )
f o r e a c h k ey Se t : k
i f ( r e c e i v e d T o S e n d . c o n t a i n s ( k ) )
ke yS e t . add ( r e c e i v e d T o S e n d . g e t ( k ) )
}
f i n d K e y s ( SimpleNode node ) {
i f ( node == EncryptTerm | | node == D e c r y p t i o n )
ke yS e t . add ( node . key )
f o r e a c h node . c h i l d : n
i f ( n != n u l l )
f i n d K e y s ( n ) ;
}
We then analyse each principal’s section of the protocol in turn. To do this we first
identify the roots of the principals by searching for the nodes marked “Principal” in
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LySa PAM State Transition Name Rate
(ν± K) (new+- K) (new+- K (by A)) nPair A
(ν K) (new K) (newKey K (by A)) nKey A
(new K) (new K (by A)) n A
〈A,B,x〉|(A,B;x) (A,B,x)|(A,B;x) transfer (from A to B) t A B
〈A,B,{x}K[at a1]〉 (A,B,(x)) encrypt (at a1) e A
〈A,B,{|x|}K[at a1]〉 (A,B,(|x|)) encrypt (at a1) ae A
decrypt x as {;z}K[at b1] decrypt x as {;z}:K decrypt (at b1) d B
decrypt x as {|;z|}K[at b1] decrypt x as {|;z|}:K decrypt (at b1) ad B
Table 4.2: PAM Transitions
the abstract syntax tree generated by the LySa parser. Each of the principal’s process
definitions are then analysed in order to generate a queue of transitions from one state
to another. A summary of the transition names and rates used in a PAM representation
of a LySa protocol are given in Table 4.2.
Each item in the queue has three parts, the current state, the name of the transition
needed to move to the next process and the rate ascribed to the transition. The current
state is typically represented by the LySa representation of the process. This rule’s ex-
ception is in the case of encrypted message parts in a send process. The problem in this
situation is that LySa does not have a separate process for encryption but considers it as
a base term. For performance modelling terms it is imperative to construct additional
processes for each encryption step. For this reason we introduce a new notation where
nested parentheses represent plain-text message parts to be encrypted and the standard
LySa curly braces represent encrypted segments. It is worth mentioning that to avoid
issues of confusion with the XML format we replace the angled brackets denoting send
with standard parentheses.
The simplest process to handle is the LySa new key-pair process. From the abstract
syntax tree, we reconstruct the appropriate LySa model. This acts as our state name.
The name of the transition is similar to this but appended with which principal is taking
the action. The rate name takes the form nPair along with the principal name.
If the process is the more general creation process, then we first determine if the
new item we are creating is a key or an object such as a nonce or another such message
part. This is due to key generation being a more complicated task which therefore is
deserving of a different rate. We have already created a list of variables used as keys
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and created a mapping of variables sent between principals to determine other names
associated with these keys. We check whether the variable in the LySa process is used
as a key or sent to another principal and used as a key there. This gives the two options
seen in Table 4.2.
Creating the PAM transitions for a LySa send process involves creating intermedi-
ate states for encryption before sending a message. The first task is to step through and
analyse each message part. If the message part is plain-text then this is stored and if the
message part is an encrypted block we store a version of the block in an unencrypted
form and also a version with the LySa formatted encryption. Once all message parts
have been processed in this manner we focus on creating the intermediate encryption
steps. Each encryption is treated as an individual step including nested encryption.
The name of the current state is the LySa model of the send process with the current
encryption step and any as-yet unencrypted segments enclosed in parentheses. The
name of the transition takes the form “encrypt (at CryptoPoint)”. The rate of the tran-
sition depends on the type of encryption. If it is asymmetric decryption the rate is of
the form “ae Principal” otherwise the rate would be “e Principal”. Once the message
is fully encrypted the final transition is to send the message. The current state is the
fully encrypted message. The name and rate of the transition are of the same form as
the name and rate for a receive process. This allows us to find appropriate pairs in the
next stage. An example of a queue for the LySa excerpt 〈A, B, {x}:K [at a dest {b}]〉
is given below.
State Transition Name Transition Rate
1. (A, B, (x)) encrypt (at a) e A
2. (A, B, {x}:k) transfer from A to B t A B
Translating a receive process into the appropriate PAM transition properties is sim-
ple. The current state property is the LySa process reconstructed. The name of the
transition takes the form “transfer from Source to Destination”. The rate of the transi-
tion is similar and has the form t Source Dest.
A decrypt process has the LySa code for the current state and the transition name
is of the form “decrypt (at CryptoPoint)”. The rate is either ad Principal or d Principal
depending on whether the decryption was asymmetric or symmetric.
For each principal we now have a list of transitions from one state to the next with
a name and a rate for the transition to the next state. The task is to convert these
multiple queues into a single PAM state transition file. We use a custom object to





TRANSITION:transfer from A to B
STATE:(A,B,x)
TRANSITION:transfer from A to B
Figure 4.2: Example Transition Queues
represent a PAM state with a List to represent a composition and a Set of these for
possible transitions. Our initial state is constructed by taking the first transitions from
each principal’s queue. To determine the possible transitions that can be made from
this state we examine each queue in turn. We check to see if the transition name is
a transfer. If the transition is something else, such as an encryption or message part
generation we can construct a new state by keeping all other queues the same and
advancing this one. If the transition is a transfer then we can only advance if there is a
corresponding transfer on another principal. When we have checked each principal in
turn we then process these new states.
4.2.1 Example
We can demonstrate this process on the example below. There are two principals which





Taking the transition queues in Figure 4.2 we construct the current state by taking
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</composition>
We now have to create the transitions for this state. To do this we look at the transition
name property. Principal A has the transition name “(new msg (by A))” so does not
require a match. We can then, temporarily, remove this transition from the queue and







We then need to append the name and rate of the transition we removed, in this case:




We now replace the transition we just removed and attempt to add any more transitions.
In this case however, the only other principal has a receive with no matching send






At this point when trying to create a transition we see that both principals’ next transi-
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<process>0</process>
</composition>




At this point all that is left to create another state with this process and a transfer to the
original state as a reset.
4.3 Asynchronous Message Transfer
In the previous section we described a translation that features synchronous message
transfer. We now present an alternative approach that models asynchronous communi-
cation. As neither of these is necessarily right or wrong we provide both approaches
to the user and allow them to choose.
To model messages in transit we introduce the notion of a buffer which is modelled
by a queue of transitions like the principal transition queues. In order to create the
PAM representation of asymmetric communication we add an extra step in the trans-
lation. If we have a “transfer” process and do not find a matching process on any
other principal’s queue then we firstly deduce whether we are dealing with a send or
receive process. Due to the same brackets being used for both processes in PAM this is
achieved by looking for the presence of a semi-colon which signifies the end of pattern
matching in a receive process.
When dealing with a send process we add the message to the buffer and advance
the current protocol queue. The prefix of the transition name is changed from transfer
to send and likewise the rate prefix from t to s. We need a new rate for this as the
transfer is now in two parts so asymmetric communication requires a separate rate or
else will be modelled as taking twice as long as it does.
If we have a receive process we compare this to the first element in the buffer for
a match. If the two transitions have the same transition name we remove the transition
from the buffer and advance the protocol with the transition name of the form receive
(by Dest from Source). This then adds the following two possible PAM transitions to
those listed in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of Synchronous Only Vs Additional Asynchronous Communi-
cation
LySa PAM State Transition Name Rate
〈A,B,x〉 (A,B,x) send (by A to B) s A B
(A,B;x) (A,B;x) receive (by B from A) r B
4.3.1 Example
To show the difference between synchronous communication and the new asynchronous




Using synchronous communication there is only one possible protocol flow. Principal
B must generate the new variable Z before a transfer can take place. If we assume
asynchronous communication however, then principal A can send the message with-
out principal B being ready to accept it. Principal B can then perform the ν process
followed by the receive process. Figure 4.3 show state transition diagrams of both
of these options, synchronous communication is shown on the left and asynchronous
on the right. As shown in this diagram, asynchronous communication includes the
synchronous option of the instantaneous send and receive transfer process.
The state space expansion viewed here is not a cause for much concern. In a more
realistic example such as the Otway-Rees protocol, with synchronous message transfer,
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the state space as seen in Figure 4.1 has 34 states. With asynchronous communication
this expands to 46, an expansion of a little over 35%. This does not significantly affect
the time taken to analyse the performance model.
4.4 AutoState
Figure 4.1 shows an example of the state transition system in pictorial form. While
this form of viewing a protocol can be illuminating, the author can personally reassure
the readers that constructing diagrams such as this is time consuming to do so by hand.
We thus present a tool which takes a PAM file and provides a similar diagram to that
in Figure 4.1.
We use the Zest package previously used in the VisuaLySa tool in Section 3.4. This
visualisation package for Eclipse plugins easily allows graph nodes to be re-arranged
by the end-user. With complicated protocols the graphs are often non-planar so can be
confusing to read. Allowing a user to highlight and manipulate nodes and edges helps
to minimise this confusion.
Another advantage that the diagrams our tool creates have over images such as
Figure 4.1 is that we add colour to the nodes. The intitial state is coloured green; the
final state is coloured red; intermediate states take on colours between green and red.
This shading from green to red shows the progress of the protocol. There will be a
single transition from a red state to a green one marking the re-initialisation of the
protocol.
Figure 4.4 shows a screenshot of the AutoState-produced diagram representing the
same state-transition diagram shown in Figure 4.1. As you can see although the tran-
sitions are labelled, the names of the state are not shown to save space. The state name
can however be shown by moving the mouse over the node. The screenshot shows the
very clear change in colour as the protocol progresses in a clockwise direction from
the left-hand side.
4.5 AutoRate
Being able to express a LySa model as a state transition system, either as a PAM file or
being represented in pictorial form reveals certain aspects of the protocol. For exam-
ple, from Figure 4.1 we can identify where there are diverging paths and the key points
where these paths join again. Despite this, the greatest amount of knowledge is gained
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Figure 4.4: AutoState Screenshot
through performing numerical analysis on a PAM file. For this to be successful, the
user needs to provide values for the rates for each transition. Providing accurate rates is
seen as a key problem in performance analysis. Different functions such as encryption
and decryption, not to mention variations such as symmetric or asymmetric cryptog-
raphy take different times on the same device. For useful and reliable information to
be gleaned from the analysis users would need to spend a lot of time determining the
appropriate values. Equally for our domain, protocols may be running over different
devices and different communication mediums and accurate rates would be needed for
each of these variations.
We solve both of these dilemmas by providing a tool which takes a user’s descrip-
tion of a deployment scenario and provides the rates that fit this description. This is
done with a graphical interface that makes it easier for those unfamiliar with the for-
mal model to achieve desirable results quickly. A screen-shot of this can be seen in
Figure 4.5. A user can choose the type of device that the principal will run on and the
network speed of the connection between communicating principals. This information
will then be used to automatically calculate the rates for all the transitions.
4.6 Analysis Opportunities
Having a protocol expressed as a PAM file allows certain mathematical analysis to take
place. These analysis methods were developed for the PEPA language. In this section
we discuss how these techniques can be used to analyse cryptographic protocols and
what they reveal about the underlying protocol.
The first tool that is ported from the PEPA Eclipse Plug-in is a single-step navigator
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Figure 4.5: AutoRate Screenshot
for navigating through the state-space diagrams presented in Section 4.4. A screenshot
of this tool in action is shown in Figure 4.6. The tool is divided into three sections. The
middle section shows the current state. The top section shows all states that can move
into the current state. In the first column it shows the action taken to move into the
current state. The bottom section shows the possible states that can be accessed from
the current state. As before, the first column shows the name of the action needed to
complete the move. Highlighted in red are the changes this action makes to the current
state. For example, in Figure 4.6 the first possible transition in the list is for principal
A to construct the nonce NA. This changes principal A’s state to the construction of
a message with an encrypted segment. Other options are for principal B to create a
nonce or principal S to create a key.
4.6.1 Utilisation
The first analysis option available to a user is to view the utilisation of a principal
during a protocol run. This information is presented in pie-chart form for each indi-
vidual principal. Examples of this sort of diagram are in Figure 4.7. The information
presented here allows a user to identify potential bottlenecks in the protocol. When
combined with the usage of the AutoRate tool to model deployment scenarios this
form of analysis allows a developer to see which device or transmission link is the
bottleneck in that particular scenario. This potentially allows the developer the chance
to upgrade the equipment that is slowing the whole protocol run down.
In Figure 4.7 utilisation graphs for both synchronised and asynchronous commu-
nication types are given for the Otway-Rees protocol. It is notable that the pie-charts
for principals A and S have zero or minimal difference between the different commu-
nication methodologies while principal B shows a marked difference. The pie charts
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Figure 4.6: Single Step Navigator
representing principal B make it clear that changing the communication type changes
which process dominates the utilisation.
In the synchronous transfer, the majority of time is spent in B’s initial send process
to principal S while with asynchronous message communication the dominant process
is the subsequent receive process from principal S. As the rates ascribed to various
transitions are not changed it seems clear that this change means that the differences in
B’s proportional usage is dependent on the interaction with S and that in synchronous
communication principal B is waiting for S to be ready to receive the message rather
than the act of communication itself taking a long time. As the only preceding process
is the new key process it must be this process that is slowing principal B. This seems
reasonable as the act of creating a key is sufficiently more complicated than creating
a regular variable and with a sufficiently fast communication medium could still be
an active process at this point in the protocol. This realisation leads us to believe that
if were to look at improving the speed of the protocol we may want to examine the
newKey rate for principal closely.
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Figure 4.7: Utilisation Graphs
4.6.2 Experimentation
In the previous section we explored the possibility of using this suite of tools to de-
termine the protocol element most in need of upgrading to improve the speed of a
protocol run. In this section we use another form of analysis to determine how much
resource should be dedicated to upgrading a single element. Graphs can be generated
showing the throughput of a particular action versus the rate. The user can determine
the values for the rate via a comma separated list or by supplying lower and upper
bounds. The examples in Figure 4.8 shows typical examples of such a graph. There is
a point in most graphs of this type where increasing the rate has a negligible impact on
the throughput. At this point there are other bottlenecks in the system that are restrict-
ing the protocol. This allows a developer to optimise the upgrades by not spending
resources where they are not getting full payback on the expenditure.
Figure 4.8 shows experimentation graphs where we compare the throughput when
the t B S,e S and nKey S rate is varied in the Otway-Rees example used throughout
this section. With the current rates it is clear that improving the nKey S rate would
make a much larger improvement to overall throughput than improving either the t B S
or e S rate would. In this scenario it may mean spending time and effort to develop
a more efficient implementation of the new key method or using a different algorithm
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Figure 4.8: Experimentation Graph
or upgrading the hardware which will additionally slightly improve the rates of other
operations for principal S.
4.6.3 Passage Time Analysis
The final analysis type we will be examining is passage time analysis. For our uses,
this analysis allows us to provide a service level agreement or quality-of-service metric
benchmarks with regard to the percentage chances of a protocol run successfully termi-
nating within a set time period. Unlike the previous sections we added this particular
analysis type to the existing PAM framework. The analysis itself is undertaken by a
Java version of the HYDRA tool[17] called jHYDRA, both of which were developed
at Imperial College London.
Due to the way we construct the PAM file we know that the source and destination
states will be the first and last states in the file, this simplifies both the analysis and the
user interface. The user must specify the start time and the end time as well as the step
period. The tool then generates either a graph showing the probability density function
or the cumulative distribution function. The probability density function graph shows
the chance of the protocol reaching the target state, in other words terminating, at any
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Figure 4.9: Passage Time Analysis Graphs
given point in the given time period. From this, it is possible to calculate the cumulative
distribution. This allows us to state the probability that the protocol will terminate by
a certain time.
To compensate for the AutoRate tool setting the reset rate as high as possible to re-
duce the time spent in the final target state, when generating the Passage Time Analysis
we change it to an average of all other rates. As this rate is not used in the passage time
analysis we can modify the rate without affecting the output and by using the average
we reduce the amount of uniformisation needed by the jHYDRA tool.
Figure 4.9 shows the two graphs created by passage time analysis inside the PAM
framework. The top diagram is the probability density showing when the protocol is
most likely to terminate. The second graph allows a reader to determine, for example,
by what time is there a 90% probability the protocol will terminate. In this instance
the value can be read off as about 0.018.
Chapter 5
Towards Formal Analysis of
Implementations
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we shall introduce the Elyjah tool which works to allow the analysis of
implementations of cryptographic protocols in the Java programming language. This is
accomplished by translating the Java program into LySa which is then analysed using
the LySatool as described in Section 2.7.
Java Elyjah LySa LySatool Errors
The ability to analyse implementations as well as specifications allows users to ver-
ify that they have correctly implemented a cryptographic protocol. The Elyjah tool is
designed to be used by those unfamiliar with the formal techniques used in this analysis
but who are required to undertake protocol analysis in order to discharge professional
responsibilities to deliver a secure product. It is assumed that those who already have
experience working with designing protocols will prefer to use other methods of pro-
tocol analysis working directly with logical reasoning and semantic representations to
analyse their new protocol ideas.
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5.2 Requirements of the Elyjah Software
As we are developing a method for analysing Java implementations of protocols our
tool has several design requirements particular to this scenario.
Naturally the first priority is for the model that Elyjah generates to be an accurate
translation of the Java into LySa. The generated LySa should be formatted such that it
is readable to a user but also able to be analysed by the LySatool without further editing
required. In particular this means that we generate LySa models in the concrete syntax
accepted by the LySatool, not the mathematical syntax used in scientific publications.
An important requirement is that the Java programs are fully runnable programs.
This means the programs should be able to contain extra code that does not directly
relate to the protocol. This additional code should be ignored by Elyjah when its
presence does not alter the protocol model.
It is also important that our technique analyses the code rather than any comments
or extraneous information in the source code file which the developers have added to
explain the intended operation of the code. We want to know that the model generated
is an accurate representation of the code.
As this tool is to be used as part of a development process it should run quickly
enough that it can be used every time that the file is compiled without excessively
delaying the developer. Additionally the tool should be presented in a way that makes
it easy to use as part of the development process. Allowing developers to validate
the correctness of their code as part of the development cycle reduces the need for
continued updating and patching of software.
5.3 The Java-LySa Application Programming Interface
Although it would be possible for a software tool to be able to accept any Java program
as input before converting the source code into a LySa process, it would be substan-
tially less reliable than one which demands a uniform input format. Thus a framework
is needed to allow developers to model protocols, while also allowing the software
tool to parse the source code and identify the security-critical operations. We have de-
signed and encapsulated an API which provides the required functionality for message
composition, encryption and communication. This API is called the Java-LySa API,
or JaLAPI for short. An implementation of a protocol needs to be a directly executable
Java program which the developer can use to test that the protocol functions as ex-
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pected before analysing its security properties. In order for it to be possible for any tool
to understand the developer’s intent, there needs to be a standard method of achieving
certain goals. As such there needs to be a uniform approach to encrypting/decrypting
data and a uniform method of sending messages between principals. JaLAPI gives a
developer easy access to such cryptographic and communication functions and makes
it easy for an automated tool to find and analyse these functions.
5.3.1 JaLAPI Requirements
Each principal must be modelled in a separate class which extends the Thread class
thus allowing multiple principals to be running at the same time, thereby simulating
LySa’s concurrent processes. There will also need to be an additional class whose main
method contains the code to set up the principals; create any keys known prior to the
commencement of a protocol; and finally establish the network through which all prin-
cipals will communicate. This network will also need to be implemented as a separate
class which is capable of keeping references to the various principals. Finally, there
needs to be a class for generating keys as both the principals and protocol initialisation
class will need to be able to do this and should use the same implementation to do so.
There needs to be an abstract class set up which implements most of the func-
tions of a principal while leaving un-implemented the run method (inherited from the
Thread class) and a method to deal with an incoming message which will be called
processIncoming. The run method will be used to start the protocol, for example,
if principal A sends the first message in a protocol, then A’s run method will contain
this code. Other functions of the class that are required would be: to organise a key
store for the three possible kinds of key: SecretKey, PublicKey and PrivateKey;
and to encrypt and decrypt blocks of messages, allowing for crypto-point annotation at
these points. These methods will be used as keywords so that the parser can pick out
the key parts of the protocol. As a developer is likely to want to be able to print out
the values of variables and other debugging information, a Logger should be set up
in the abstract class to encourage developers to use this rather than the less structured
println system call. In addition, a uniform method of dealing with incoming mes-
sages is needed. Elyjah uses case/switch blocks to separate the code for dealing with
individual messages. A variable stores which message is expected next and each time
the processIncoming method is called this variable is incremented. Pattern matching
is modelled by using a method check which validates that the value at each position
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of the incoming messages matches the value which is expected. The network class
only needs methods to send a message from one principal to another and some method
of registering principals. The key generation class needs to have a method to return
a SecretKey for symmetric encryption and another method to return a KeyPair for
asymmetric encryption. Messages will be a custom object named Message. The send
command will need to have an argument for this object and the intended recipient of
the message.
Encryption and decryption methods will also work on the same bespoke message
objects and will require optional arguments for crypto-points. This will require several
different overloadings of these methods as it is possible for the crypto-point to spec-
ify only the current location, one origin/destination, multiple origins/destinations or
neither.
5.3.2 The JaLAPI KeyGeneration class
Key generation is required for principals when in a protocol run but additionally it is
needed for any keys which must be shared before a protocol is run. We need to generate
keys for both symmetric and asymmetric encryption types. The KeyGeneration class
contains two methods for generating different types of keys, generateSharedKey and
generateKeyPair. The JavaDoc for these methods is presented in Table 5.1. These
return a SecretKey and a KeyPair respectively. These are both objects provided by
standard Java classes. A SecretKey is part of the javax.crypto package and the
KeyPair is provided by java.security. The KeyPair object is a holder for a public
and a private key which can be retrieved with getPublic and getPrivate method
invocations. There is a hierarchy for Key objects which is represented by Figure 5.1.
This allows us to use a key store for objects of the parent type Key which is sufficient
for all sub-types.
5.3.3 The JaLAPI Principal class
This class provides all the functionality needed by a principal in a cryptographic pro-
tocol. In order to deal with incoming messages the class must override the abstract
processIncoming method. To help with this we provide a check method which helps
with the pattern matching section of the message processing.
The encryption-related methods are presented in Table 5.3. As we will be dealing with
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Method Summary
static java.security.KeyPair generateKeyPair(long userseed)
Returns a KeyPair object that can then be
used to retrieve matching PublicKey and
PrivateKey objects.
static javax.crypto.SecretKey generateSharedKey()
Returns a SecretKey object that can then be
used to encrypt Message objects.




Figure 5.1: Key Hierarchy in Java
encryption and decryption on blocks of text we will use our bespoke Message object
as a wrapper for plain-text message parts. The decryption and encryption methods are
also overloaded with methods which have additional parameters representing crypto-
points. These parameters are a String for the label of the current crypto-point and
either another String representing a single origin or destination or an array contain-
ing multiple possible crypto-points. These overloaded methods discard the additional
parameters and call the standard encrypt or decrypt methods.
Table 5.4 lists the methods which are used to represent the creation of ν LySa pro-
cesses. While generateMessage is used as a signpost without doing any processing
and simply returns the input parameter, generateNonce does produce a String repre-
sentation of a nonce. Methods for generating a SecretKey or a KeyPair call the same
methods in the KeyGeneration class.
We provide a key-store so that we can store keys along with a label which will be used
to refer to the key in the LySa model. This allows us to consistently use the same name
to refer to the key across different principals without worrying about the name of the
variable that the developer used in each instance. The methods detailed in Table 5.5
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Method Summary
abstract void processIncoming(Message msg)
Override this to process this incoming message
void check(java.lang.Object a, java.lang.Object b)
Compare the two parameters, throws an error if they are not equal
Table 5.2: The JaLAPI Principal class methods for incoming messages
Method Summary
Message decrypt(java.lang.String str, java.security.Key
key)
Decrypts an encrypted message with given key
java.lang.String encrypt(Message msg, java.security.Key key)
Encrypts a Message with given key
java.lang.String hash(Message msg)
Hash function





Returns a SecretKey object that can then be used to
encrypt Message objects.
java.security.KeyPair generateKeyPair(long userseed)
Returns a KeyPair object that can then be used to re-
trieve matching PublicKey and PrivateKey objects.
Table 5.4: The JaLAPI Principal class methods for generating new objects important
to a cryptographic protocol
allow a developer to store a key in the key store along with this label and retrieve it at
a later point in the protocol run.
The sendKey method is used to return a Key in a transmissible format that can
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Method Summary
void registerKey(java.security.Key key, String
name)
Register key in keystore with accompanying label
java.security.Key getKey(String name)
Retrieve a Key from the keystore which was stored with the
given label
Table 5.5: The JaLAPI Principal class key-store related methods
be sent in a Message and then reformatted into the appropriate Key type. We provide




Returns String representation of Key
java.security.PrivateKey receivePrivateKey(java.lang.String str)
Turns a String representation of a private key into
a PrivateKey object
java.security.PublicKey receivePublicKey(java.lang.String str)
Turns a String representation of a public key into
a PublicKey object
javax.crypto.SecretKey receiveSecretKey(java.lang.String str)
Turns a String representation of a symmetric key
into a SecretKey
Table 5.6: The JaLAPI Principal class methods for sending and receiving Key objects
5.3.4 The JaLAPI Network class
The network class is primarily used to pass messages between principals. We register
principals with a network then send messages using the name we register them with.
As well as passing the message to the correct principal, the Network layer also sets the
source and destination of the message prior to transmission. It is also used to pass any
keys that need to be known by multiple principals before a protocol begins.
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Method Summary
void register(java.lang.String name, Principal comClass)
Register new principal with the network
void send(java.lang.String dest, Message msg)
Send a message to a principal that has registered with the network
void shareKey(java.security.Key key, java.lang.String name)
Send a key to all principals
Table 5.7: The JaLAPI Network class methods
5.3.5 The JaLAPI Message class
In order to be able to exercise control over the manipulation of message contents we
provide an implementation of a message. By providing a bespoke object with addi-
tional fields for the source and destination rather than using a standard variation of a
List we restrict a developer’s options to modify the contents. With this we can control
the order that message parts are added and inspected making the analysis more secure.
The following public methods are provided:
Constructor Summary
Message()
Creates a new empty Message object
Method Summary
void add(java.lang.String msgPart)
Adds a new String to the message
java.lang.String getDest()
Returns String representation of intended message destina-
tion.
java.lang.String getNext()
Returns the next part of the message.
java.lang.String getSource()
Returns String representation of message source.
java.lang.String toString()
String representation of message contents
Table 5.8: The JaLAPI Message class methods
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We also provide methods for setting the source and destination of the message but
access to these methods is restricted to other classes in the JaLAPI package. This is so
that they are set by the Network class and cannot be modified by the user.
5.3.6 JaLAPI Trace
In the provided JaLAPI implementation, certain methods produce logging information.
This serves two purposes that are both related to the tools presented in Chapters 3 and 4.
The first usage is to generate protocol narration similar to that provided by the
AnaLySa as described in Section 3.3. This execution trace shows the message sent but
leaves out encrypted message block contents providing only the number of parts.
The second function is that for tasks such as encryption or message part generation
the time taken for these actions to complete is provided to the user to use as a rate for
the AutoRate tool as defined in Section 4.5.
5.4 Elyjah Implementation
Elyjah identifies method calls to the provided API. Using these method calls as sign-
posts, the cryptographic and communication parts of the security protocol can be di-
vined. This is required as Java is more expressive than LySa so the language needs to
be restricted in order to be able to achieve accurate translation. This means that Elyjah
allows a Java implementation of a cryptographic protocol to be translated into a formal
model. The LySa model can be analysed using the LySatool to return the security prop-
erties of the protocol implementation. While Elyjah cannot analyse the source code of
an arbitrary communications package, it is possible to implement a protocol that can
be translated by Elyjah and used in a full application.
5.4.1 Java Parser and Abstract Syntax Tree
Before working on the conversion process itself, it is necessary to create a Java parser.
Like the LySa parser from Section 3.1 we use the combination of JJTree and JavaCC
to produce an abstract syntax tree similar to the one for LySa. It is then possible to
navigate the abstract syntax tree much as any other tree. Classes, methods and even
single lines of code have a tree structure so a single SimpleNode can be used as a
pointer to any part of the code. An example of one line of code represented as an
abstract syntax tree is given in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Syntax Tree of msgToB.add(encrypt(msgToBEncrypted, keyAB, “a2”, “b3”));
5.4.2 Code Analysis
The first stage in analysing a Java application is to scan the complete Java source file
to locate the roots of the separate principal classes. A class name can be found by
searching the syntax tree for a node containing the string ClassOrInterfaceDeclaration.
Once this node is found the name of the class is located in the first child of this node.
It is also necessary to have a mapping between the name of classes and the name
used to register them with the Network class. By scanning the set-up class we find
the invocations of the network’s register method in order to identify the name of
the principals. This set up class is also scanned for any method invocations of the
KeyGeneration class which will be used to generate some LySa code. This process
will be repeated later so we place this in a separate method so that we can re-use it
later. Once this set-up class is scanned we analyse each of the LySa classes in turn.
For each class we identify the name of the Network object by analysing the source
code and examining the name of the variable where we save the Network in the con-
structor. We then determine whether the class contains a run method. If it does we start
our analysis of the class here by firstly generating new expressions (Section 5.4.2.1)
and then generate any send expressions present in this block of code (Section 5.4.2.3).
After this Elyjah generates the LySa code equivalent to the Java code in the principal’s
processIncomingMessage method as described in Section 5.4.2.6.
5.4.2.1 Generating New Expressions
This method is applied to a block of code, and searches for all Java code which is
equivalent to LySa processes involving the ν operator. We search recursively down
from the parent searching for certain method calls. If we find invocations of the meth-
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ods generateMessage or generateNonce then we update our LySa code with the
name of the variable in a LySa restriction process such as:
(new variable)
If the method is generateSharedKey we firstly find the name of the variable used
to store the SecretKey. However in the LySa model we want to refer to the name of
the key and not the variable in which it happens to be stored. For this reason we search
the surrounding block of code to identify the label using the technique described in
Section 5.4.2.2. The returned name of the key is then used in our LySa code in
(new keyLabel)
If an invocation of the generateKeyPair method is found then we get the variable
name from the method invocation and resolve the name of the key pair by finding the
name of the variable of either a public or private key generated by the key pair by
searching for method invocations getPrivate or getPublic. We use the process in
Section 5.4.2.2 to get the label this key is registered with and if necessary remove either
the + or - symbol to obtain a general name for the pair of keys.
5.4.2.2 Resolving Keys
We firstly identify the key type based on the type of variable used. This will either
be SecretKey, PublicKey or PrivateKey. Then we search for calls to methods ac-
cessing or modifying the key store to find the label the key is stored with. These will
typically be either the methods for registering the key or getting the key defined in
Table 5.5 but could also be the shareKey method used in the set up class to initialise
keys that were set up before the protocol starts. If dealing with asymmetric encryption
then we append a + or - if the key is a public or private key and does not have a sign at
the moment.
5.4.2.3 Generating Send Processes
We already know the Network name and using this we search for all method invo-
cations of this object’s send method. For each of these that we find, we identify the
destination from the method invocation. The LySa send process begins with the first
two tuples being the source and intended destination of the message. We can also
identify the name of the Message from the method invocation. We then determine the
contents of the message.
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5.4.2.4 Processing Message Contents
We first find all messageName.add method invocations. For each of these we see
whether what we are adding contains a method invocation to encrypt or hash, in that
case we determine the contents of the plain-text with the techniques decribed in Sec-
tion 5.4.2.5 and append the returned LySa code from this method. If there is a method
invocation of sendKey then we resolve the label of this key as in Section 5.4.2.2 and
we append this to the contents of the message. If we are adding a string literal we
append this and if we are appending a variable we determine if this is an encrypted
block and if so we determine the contents.
5.4.2.5 Generating Encrypted Blocks
We append the opening to a LySa encryption portion, and if the encryption is asym-
metrical we denote this syntactically. By examining the encrypt or hash method in-
vocation we determine the name of the Message object. We append the contents of the
encrypted portion by repeating the process in the previous section on this Message ob-
ject. We close the encrypted portion and specify the encryption key. If we are hashing
rather than encrypting then we use the key is “MD5+” to denote public key encryption
with specifying a corresponding key which can be used to decrypt the message. If
this is a normal encryption then we get the variable name from the method invocation
and use the technique in Section 5.4.2.2 to get the correct key name. Crypto-points
are then attempted to be added from the method invocation with exception handling to
cope with any absences. If the destination crypto-point is an array of possible crypto-
points then the same technique as identifying the contents of a Message presented in
Section 5.4.2.4 is used.
5.4.2.6 Analysing a Principal’s processIncomingMethod
The first task is to identify the name of the Message object containing the incoming
message from the parameter in the name of the method header. We then separate the
method into different switch statements. We tackle each of these individually and in
order generate LySa restriction processes, input processes followed by decrypt and
finally send processes.
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5.4.2.7 Generating Input Processes
Initially, the task is to find all method invocations of the Message object’s check
method. This includes checkSource and checkDest which are used to form the first
two parts of the tuple. These two followed by the other checks are appended to the
LySa model. We insert a separator and then continue finding all method invocations of
the getNext method of the Message.
5.4.2.8 Generating decrypt Processes
Firstly find decrypt statements of the form
Message d = decrypt(stringName, keyVariable, crypto1, crypto2)
The start of the LySa process for decryption can then be appended
decrypt stringName as{
specifying asymmetric decryption as needed. In order to process the contents of the
encrypted message we proceed as in Section 5.4.2.7. Namely we first process the
invocations of the check to the Message referred to in the Java decrypt method invo-
cation. As before we continue finding all method invocations of the getNext method
of the Message then determine the key name by using the process in Section 5.4.2.2
on the variable keyVariable. Crypto-points are dealt with as in encryption.
5.5 Eclipse IDE Integration
This whole process works in the Eclipse IDE, and is designed to immediately give
the developer feedback as to the security properties of their protocol implementation.
Elyjah is provided as an Eclipse plug-in and is available as a compilation-time tool
to analyse a Java file and provide feedback in the same way as the Java compiler
might, by opening a console in the IDE. Figure 5.3 shows Elyjah running as an Eclipse
plug-in producing the LySa model. The results of the LySatool are also presented to
the developer in the Elyjah console, giving them immediate feedback on the security
properties of their implementation.
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Figure 5.3: Screenshot of Eclipse IDE with Java editor and Elyjah console highlighted
5.5.1 Performance
The table below shows performance figures for a range of cryptographic protocols.
These figures demonstrate that these tools are efficient enough to be used as part of a
usual development cycle. Equally, it is worth noting that these times are much lower
than those exhibited by tools such as FS2PV[9] or the much more efficient follow up
F7[7]. Comparison of performance timing with such tools is hard as the inputs are
vastly different and the programs are running on different computers. Despite this, it is
worth noting that FS2PV takes eight and a half minutes to analyse an implementation
of the Otway-Rees protocol and F7 takes a minute and a half to do so.
Protocol Implementation Timings
LoC Messages Principals Elyjah LySatool
Needham-Schroder 238 6 3 0.055s 0.156s
Otway-Rees 229 5 3 0.063s 0.143s
Wide Mouth Frog 157 3 3 0.042s 0.126s
Yahalom 219 4 3 0.063s 0.147s
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5.6 Worked Examples
5.6.1 Naive Public Key Protocol Example
In order to demonstrate this process, we will present the implementation and analysis
of a very simple public key protocol. The standard narration is as follows:
A → B : K+
B → A : {msg}K+
The clear goal of this protocol is to allow secure communication between principals
A and B by having B’s message to A being encrypted. By implementing this model
in Java and then using Elyjah and the LySatool we will prove that this goal is not
achieved.
The following excerpts are taken from a single Java file which simulates the ex-
ecution of the above protocol. It is important to note that it represents a runnable
program that can also be run over a distributed environment. The two principals are
implemented in separate classes, which run as separate threads, within one Java file.
These principals must extend the abstract class named Principal. This abstract class
implements key management and encryption functionality and provides an abstract
processIncoming method for developers to extend to implement receiving messages.
The Principal class itself extends the Thread class allowing the principal to be run
concurrently with other principals in the protocol.
Firstly the principals and network must be set up as below. Any keys shared be-
tween principals must also be generated and shared at this stage. Although this is not
required in this example, it can be seen in Figure 5.3.
p u b l i c c l a s s PKEncrypt ionExample ex tends K e y G e n e r a t i o n C l a s s {
p u b l i c s t a t i c vo id main ( S t r i n g [ ] a r g s ) {
Network n e t = new Network ( ) ;
PKEA a = new PKEA( n e t ) ;
n e t . r e g i s t e r ( ”A” , a ) ;
PKEB b = new PKEB( n e t ) ;
n e t . r e g i s t e r ( ”B” , b ) ;
a . s t a r t ( ) ;
b . s t a r t ( ) ;
}
}
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5.6.1.1 Principal A’s first message
In order to initiate the protocol the following code is contained in the principal’s run
method.
p u b l i c vo id run ( ) {
KeyPai r k e y p a i r = g e n e r a t e K e y P a i r ( 1 0 2 4 ) ;
P r i v a t e K e y p r i v a t e K e y = k e y p a i r . g e t P r i v a t e ( ) ;
Pub l i cKey pub l i cKey = k e y p a i r . g e t P u b l i c ( ) ;
r e g i s t e r K e y ( p r i v a t e K e y , ”K−” ) ;
r e g i s t e r K e y ( publ icKey , ”K+” ) ;
Message v = new Message ( ) ;
v . add ( sendKey ( pub l i cKey ) ) ;
n e t . send ( ”B” , v ) ;
}
The first three lines generate asymmetric keys using a call to the provided API’s
generateKeyPair method which returns a KeyPair object created by a series of calls
to Java’s built-in cryptography library. The calls to the registerKey method have two
purposes. In the context of the program it allows the keys to be stored and used again
in other methods. The additional function allows Elyjah to map the variable name
used for the key to the name given. The final three lines initialise, populate and send
the message from A to B using the provided bespoke Message class and Network class
represented by the object net. The sendKey method is used to convert the PublicKey
object into a String object for transmission. Due to LySa using the key name defined
in the registerKey method call the LySa code will appear not as publicKey but K+.
5.6.1.2 Principal B’s receipt of message and reply
This code is from principal B’s processIncoming method.
p u b l i c vo id p r o c e s s I n c o m i n g ( Message v ){
sw i t ch ( receivedNum ) {
check ( v . g e t S o u r c e ( ) , ”A” ) ;
check ( v . g e t D e s t ( ) , ”B” ) ;
Pub l i cKey key = r e c e i v e P u b l i c K e y ( v . g e t N e x t ( ) ) ;
r e g i s t e r K e y ( key , ”K” ) ;
Message vEnc = new Message ( ) ;
S t r i n g message = g e n e r a t e M e s s a g e ( ” s e c r e t message ” ) ;
vEnc . add ( message ) ;
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Message v2 = new Message ( ) ;
v2 . add ( e n c r y p t ( vEnc , key , ” b1 ” , ” a1 ” ) ) ;
n e t . send ( ”A” , v2 ) ;
}
}
The first four lines deal with the incoming message from A. The first two lines check
that the source and destination match the expected participant’s roles. The following
two lines firstly use the receivePublicKey method to transform the String object
into a PublicKey which is then registered with the principal’s keystore. The next block
of code deals with the construction of B’s reply. Encrypted parts of the message are
represented by another Message object. Encryption and adding the subset to the mes-
sage occur at the same time in the penultimate line of the code. The encrypt method
call returns a String object which is an encrypted representation of the Message con-
tents. The final two parameters of the encrypt method call represent the crypto-points
that the LySatool uses to analyse security properties. The first parameter is a label for
”at” and the second defines where this message should be decrypted.
5.6.1.3 Principal A’s decryption of message
This code is from principal A’s processIncoming method.
p u b l i c vo id p r o c e s s I n c o m i n g ( Message v ){
sw i t ch ( receivedNum ) {
check ( v . g e t S o u r c e ( ) , ”B” ) ;
check ( v . g e t D e s t ( ) , ”A” ) ;
S t r i n g msgToBeDecoded = v . g e t N e x t ( ) ;
P r i v a t e K e y keyD = ( P r i v a t e K e y ) getKey ( ”K−” ) ;
Message decode =
d e c r y p t ( msgToBeDecoded , keyD , ” a1 ” , ” b1 ” ) ;
S t r i n g msg = decode . g e t N e x t ( ) ;
t h e L o g g e r . i n f o ( msg ) ;
}
}
This block highlights the decryption process, this involves retrieving a key from the
principal’s keystore and converting a String into a Message object. This new Message
can then have parts checked or assigned to variables like any other Message.
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5.6.1.4 LySa model from Elyjah
The result of running Elyjah on the Java file representing this protocol is given below.
The first two lines represent principal A, the last line represents principal B.
(ν ± K)〈A,B,K+〉.(B,A;msgToBeDecoded).
decrypt msgToBeDecoded as {|;msg|}K− [ at a1 orig { b1 } ] in 0
|
(ν message) (A,B;K).〈B,A,{|message|}K [ at b1 dest { a1 } ] 〉.0
Table 5.9: LySa model of Naive Public Key Encryption
5.6.1.5 LySatool result and analysis
This analysis by the LySatool reveals several attacks. The first section reveals the
message parts that can be read by an attacker. The worrying item here is that the
message which is intended to be secret is included here. This is because an attacker
can pose as A, start a conversation with B with the attacker’s own public key and
decrypt it with their own private key. Equally an attacker can intercept A’s message to
B and reply with their own message, posing as B, clearly a problem if A interprets this
message as a command.
Values that may not be confidential
K+, {|Lmessage|}l• [at b1 dest a1 ], n•, m•+, m•-, B, A,
{|l•|}l• [at CPDY], message
Violation of authentication properties (Ψ)
(b1, CPDY), (CPDY, a1)
5.6.2 Otway-Rees Protocol
As a more complete example we also take a look at the Otway-Rees key sharing
protocol[61]. This protocol establishes a fresh symmetric key for communication be-
tween two principals A and B. This protocol relies on the presence of a trusted server
S who already has long term keys KAS and KAB for communicating with principals A
and B respectively. As presented in the original text the protocol is as follows:
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1. A → B : M, A, B, {NA, M, A , B}KA
2. B → S : M, A, B, {NA, M, A , B}KA , {NB, M, A , B}KB
3. S → B : M, {NA, K}KA , {NB, K}KB
4. B → A : M, {NA, K}KA
As mentioned in Section 2.5.2 some protocols require the message parts to be reorgan-
ised in order to encode the protocol in LySa. The encrypted sections in messages 1
and 2 need to be rearranged to place the nonces NA and NB at the end of the encrypted
section so that we can bind these to variables and check the other message parts. An
additional final step has been added to the protocol where principal B sends a secret
message to principal A using the fresh key. This allows the LySatool to validate that
secure communication using this key is possible. This updated protocol is shown be-
low.
1. A → B : M, A, B, {M, A , B, NA}KA
2. B → S : M, A, B, {M, A , B, NA}KA , {M, A , B, NA}KB
3. S → B : M, {NA, K}KA , {NB, K}KB
4. B → A : M, {NA, K}KA
5. B → A : {msg}K
This protocol differs from the one in Section 5.6.1 in several ways, not least that keys
are shared beforehand. This peculiarity is shown in the following section of Java code,
the set up class.
p u b l i c s t a t i c vo id main ( S t r i n g [ ] a r g s ) {
Network n e t = new Network ( ) ;
ORA a = new ORA( n e t ) ;
n e t . r e g i s t e r ( ”A” , a ) ;
ORB b = new ORB( n e t ) ;
n e t . r e g i s t e r ( ”B” , b ) ;
ORS s = new ORS( n e t ) ;
n e t . r e g i s t e r ( ”S” , s ) ;
Sec re tKey keyA = g e n e r a t e S h a r e d K e y ( ) ;
Sec re tKey keyB = g e n e r a t e S h a r e d K e y ( ) ;
a . shareKey ( keyA , ”KAS” ) ;
s . shareKey ( keyA , ”KAS” ) ;
b . shareKey ( keyB , ”KBS” ) ;
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s . shareKey ( keyB , ”KBS” ) ;
a . s t a r t ( ) ;
b . s t a r t ( ) ;
s . s t a r t ( ) ;
}
5.6.2.1 LySa model from Elyjah
The result of running Elyjah on the Java file representing this protocol is given below.
The first two lines represent the situation before the protocol begins with keys shared
between the server and each of the principals. Technically, this model represents that
all protocols know both these keys but looking through the rest of the protocol it is
clear that only principals A and S know the key KAS and equally only B and S know
KBS. The next three lines represent principal A, the middle three represent principal B
and the final three lines represent principal S.
Analysis of this model indicates that no crypto-point assertions are broken and that the
(ν KAS) (ν KBS)
(!(ν NA) 〈A,B,M,A,B,{A,B,M,NA}KAS [ at a1 dest { s1 } ] 〉.(B,A,M;x1). decrypt
x1 as {NA;xk}KAS [ at a2 orig { s3 } ] in (B,A;x2). decrypt x2 as {;xmsg}xk [ at a3
orig { b3 } ] in 0
|
!(ν NB) (A,B,M,A,B;y1).〈B,S,M,A,B,y1,{A,B,M,NB}KBS [ at b1 dest { s2 } ] 〉.(ν
MSG) (S,B,M;y2,y3). decrypt y3 as {NB;yk}KBS [ at b2 orig { s4 } ] in 〈B,A,M,y2〉.
〈B,A,{MSG}yk [ at b3 dest { a3 } ] 〉.0
|
!(ν K) (B,S,M,A,B;z1,z2). decrypt z1 as {A,B,M;zna}KAS [ at s1 orig { a1 } ] in
decrypt z2 as {A,B,M;znb}KBS [ at s2 orig { b1 } ] in 〈S,B,M,{zna,K}KAS [ at s3
dest { a2 } ] ,{znb,K}KBS [ at s4 dest { b2 } ] 〉.0)
Table 5.10: LySa model of Otway-Rees Encryption
supposedly secret msg sent in the final message is indeed confidential and an attacker
cannot read it.
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5.7 Meta-LySa and the Deployment Scenario Solution
Introduced in Section 2.5.4, Meta-Level LySa allows us to describe the deployment
scenario of a protocol. Protocols will often reveal different flaws when multiple copies
of principals are running simultaneously. This situation allows an attacker to use mes-
sages from one session in another session either parallel or at a later time. The LySa
model in Table 5.10 represents a situation where there is a single principal A and a
single principal B who initiate a single session with a server S. In the rest of this
section we will use Elyjah to generate more general deployment scenarios and see if
the LySatool analysis changes with these models. When generating LySa models Ely-
jah offers users the chance to add meta-level indicies through the following pop-up
dialogue.
5.7.1 Multiple Participants
The LySa model in Table 5.11 describes the most basic parallel situation where a prin-
cipal S acts as a solo server and there exists an arbitrarily large set of initiators who
attempt to establish communication with each acting as either initiators or responders.
Principals share a pair of keys with the server. One for when they act as an initiator and
another for when they are assuming the role of a responder. In this scenario, a prin-
cipal will use the key KAS when acting as a initiator and the key KBS as a responder.
Analysing this example with the LySatool presents the same results as with the stan-
dard LySa model in Table 5.10. This tells us that with distinct roles for principals and
with principals using different keys for these different roles adding multiple versions
of principals A and B does not negatively affect the security properties of the protocol.
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let R ⊆ N in
let S ⊆ N in
(νi∈R KASi )(ν j∈S KBS j )((|i∈R | j∈S !(ν NAi, j ) 〈Ai,B j,Mi, j ,Ai,B j,{Ai,B j,Mi, j
,NAi, j } KASi [ at a1i, j dest { s1i, j } ] 〉.(B j,Ai,Mi, j ;x1i, j ). decrypt x1i, j as {NAi, j
;xki, j } KASi [ at a2i, j orig { s3i, j } ] in (B j,Ai;x2i, j ). decrypt x2i, j as {;xmsgi, j }
xki, j [ at a3i, j orig { b3i, j } ] in 0)
|
(|i∈R | j∈S !(ν NBi, j ) (Ai,B j,Mi, j ,Ai,B j;y1i, j ).〈B j,S,Mi, j ,Ai,B j,y1i, j ,{Ai,B j,Mi, j
,NBi, j } KBS j [ at b1i, j dest { s2i, j } ] 〉.(ν MSGi, j ) (S,B j,Mi, j ;y2i, j ,y3i, j ). de-
crypt y3i, j as {NBi, j ;yki, j } KBS j [ at b2i, j orig { s4i, j } ] in 〈B j,Ai,Mi, j ,y2i, j
〉.〈B j,Ai,{MSGi, j } yki, j [ at b3i, j dest { a3i, j } ] 〉.0)
|
(|i∈R | j∈S !(ν Ki, j ) (B j,S,Mi, j ,Ai,B j;z1i, j ,z2i, j ). decrypt z1i, j as {Ai,B j,Mi, j ;znai, j
} KASi [ at s1i, j orig { a1i, j } ] in decrypt z2i, j as {Ai,B j,Mi, j ;znbi, j } KBS j [ at
s2i, j orig { b1i, j } ] in 〈S,B j,Mi, j ,{znai, j ,Ki, j } KASi [ at s3i, j dest { a2i, j } ]
,{znbi, j ,Ki, j } KBS j [ at s4i, j dest { b2i, j } ] 〉.0))
Table 5.11: Meta-LySa model of Otway-Rees Encryption
5.7.2 Bi-directional Key Establishment
This scenario could be more generalised by declaring that each principal can act as
both an initiator and a responder in a protocol. In this situation we replace principals
A and B with a new indexed principal I. In this situation every principal Ii will initi-
ate a session with every other principal I j while also responding to sessions started by
principals I j. Table 5.12 details a deployment scenario where principals use the same
address for initiating and responding although use different keys for these different
roles. Analysis of this deployment scenario does not alter the security properties of
this protocol.
Another potential scenario would be where we use the same key when a principal is
cast as either initiator or responder but use different addresses for these roles.
The analysis of this deployment scenario yields several errors. In fact we can detect er-
rors in several of LySatool’s output mechanisms. We have violations of crypto-points,
supposedly secret messages not being confidential and variables being bound to items
they should not be. The full list of crypto-point violations reported by the LySatool
are presented with indices added and thus would take up several pages of this thesis,
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let R ⊆ N in
let S ⊆ N in
(νi∈R KASi )(ν j∈S KBS j )((|i∈R | j∈S !(ν NAi, j ) 〈Ii,I j,Mi, j ,Ii,I j,{Ii,I j,Mi, j ,NAi, j }
KASi [ at a1i, j dest { s1i, j } ] 〉.(I j,Ii,Mi, j ;x1i, j ). decrypt x1i, j as {NAi, j ;xki, j }
KASi [ at a2i, j orig { s3i, j } ] in (I j,Ii;x2i, j ). decrypt x2i, j as {;xmsgi, j } xki, j [ at
a3i, j orig { b3i, j } ] in 0)
|
(|i∈R | j∈S !(ν NBi, j ) (Ii,I j,Mi, j ,Ii,I j;y1i, j ).〈I j,S,Mi, j ,Ii,I j,y1i, j ,{Ii,I j,Mi, j ,NBi, j }
KBS j [ at b1i, j dest { s2i, j } ] 〉.(ν MSGi, j ) (S,I j,Mi, j ;y2i, j ,y3i, j ). decrypt y3i, j as
{NBi, j ;yki, j } KBS j [ at b2i, j orig { s4i, j } ] in 〈I j,Ii,Mi, j ,y2i, j 〉.〈I j,Ii,{MSGi, j }
yki, j [ at b3i, j dest { a3i, j } ] 〉.0)
|
(|i∈R | j∈S !(ν Ki, j ) (I j,S,Mi, j ,Ii,I j;z1i, j ,z2i, j ). decrypt z1i, j as {Ii,I j,Mi, j ;znai, j }
KASi [ at s1i, j orig { a1i, j } ] in decrypt z2i, j as {Ii,I j,Mi, j ;znbi, j } KBS j [ at s2i, j
orig { b1i, j } ] in 〈S,I j,Mi, j ,{znai, j ,Ki, j } KASi [ at s3i, j dest { a2i, j } ] ,{znbi, j
,Ki, j } KBS j [ at s4i, j dest { b2i, j } ] 〉.0))
Table 5.12: Meta-LySa model of Otway-Rees Encryption with Bi-Directional Key Estab-
lishment
presented below are these violations with indices and repetitions removed.
Violation of authentication properties (ψ)
(a1, CPDY), (a1, s2), (b1, CPDY), (b1, s1), (b3, CPDY), (s3, b2), (s3, CPDY), (s4,
a2), (s4, CPDY), (CPDY, a2), (CPDY, a3), (CPDY, b2), (CPDY, s1), (CPDY, s2)
The analysis also reports that the following crypto-point assertions do not hold within
a single session (b3, a3), (s3, a2), (s4, b2).
The analysis also tells us that variables are bound to incorrect values.
ρ(znai, j) = NBi, j, NAi, j
ρ(znbi, j) = NBi, j, NAi, j
Variable znai, j should only ever be bound to variable NAi, j and equally variable znbi, j
is only intended to be bound to variable NBi, j. These attacks correspond to type flaw
attacks where a principal is tricked into establishing a connection with itself.
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let R ⊆ N in
let S ⊆ N in
(νi∈R KSi )((|i∈R | j∈S !(ν NAi, j ) 〈Ii,I j,Mi, j ,Ii,I j,{Ii,I j,Mi, j ,NAi, j } KSi [ at a1i, j
dest { s1i, j } ] 〉.(I j,Ii,Mi, j ;x1i, j ). decrypt x1i, j as {NAi, j ;xki, j } KSi [ at a2i, j orig
{ s3i, j } ] in (I j,Ii;x2i, j ). decrypt x2i, j as {;xmsgi, j } xki, j [ at a3i, j orig { b3i, j } ]
in 0)
|
(|i∈R | j∈S !(ν NBi, j ) (Ii,I j,Mi, j ,Ii,I j;y1i, j ).〈I j,S,Mi, j ,Ii,I j,y1i, j ,{Ii,I j,Mi, j ,NBi, j }
KS j [ at b1i, j dest { s2i, j } ] 〉.(ν MSGi, j ) (S,I j,Mi, j ;y2i, j ,y3i, j ). decrypt y3i, j as
{NBi, j ;yki, j } KS j [ at b2i, j orig { s4i, j } ] in 〈I j,Ii,Mi, j ,y2i, j 〉.〈I j,Ii,{MSGi, j }
yki, j [ at b3i, j dest { a3i, j } ] 〉.0)
|
(|i∈R | j∈S !(ν Ki, j ) (I j,S,Mi, j ,Ii,I j;z1i, j ,z2i, j ). decrypt z1i, j as {Ii,I j,Mi, j ;znai, j }
KSi [ at s1i, j orig { a1i, j } ] in decrypt z2i, j as {Ii,I j,Mi, j ;znbi, j } KS j [ at s2i, j orig
{ b1i, j } ] in 〈S,I j,Mi, j ,{znai, j ,Ki, j } KSi [ at s3i, j dest { a2i, j } ] ,{znbi, j ,Ki, j }
KS j [ at s4i, j dest { b2i, j } ] 〉.0))
Table 5.13: LySa model of Otway-Rees Encryption with same key for initiating and
responding
5.7.3 Insider Attacks
As well as situations where an attacker is trying to break in from the outside we must
also consider insider attacks. In this scenario the attacker is an illegitimate principal,
attempting to use his inside knowledge to gain more knowledge than they are allowed.
A malicious insider is a powerful attacker in any situation. They do not need to break
any perimeter defences and already have more knowledge than an outside attacker. A
typical scenario may be an employee for a large company who is authorised to access
details of his own clients but wants to be able to access all client information.
We also need to consider a scenario where an active principal is not the attacker
but is leaking information to an outside attacker. This could be a deliberate, conscious
move or perhaps they are doing so unwittingly through an attacker’s machinations.
To model this unwanted flow of data we give illegitimate principals the index 0.
All information with an index 0 is not restricted so our attacker model has access to it.
If an attacker has this information they can then act as an illegitimate principal in order
to attack a legitimate principal. We also modify the parallel composition |i∈R | j∈S to
5.7. Meta-LySa and the Deployment Scenario Solution 89
allow for an initiator to begin a session with an illegitimate principal, for a responder
to communicate to an illegitimate principal and for the server to communicate with
illegitimate principals. The LySa model in Table 5.14 reflects this scenario.
let R ⊆ N in
let S ⊆ N in
((|i∈R | jinS∪{0} !(ν NAi, j ) 〈Ii,I j,Mi, j ,Ii,I j,{Ii,I j,Mi, j ,NAi, j } KSi [ at a1i, j dest {
s1i, j } ] 〉.(I j,Ii,Mi, j ;x1i, j ). decrypt x1i, j as {NAi, j ;xki, j } KSi [ at a2i, j orig { s3i, j
} ] in (I j,Ii;x2i, j ). decrypt x2i, j as {;xmsgi, j } xki, j [ at a3i, j orig { b3i, j } ] in 0)
|
(|iinR∪{0} | j∈S !(ν NBi, j ) (Ii,I j,Mi, j ,Ii,I j;y1i, j ).〈I j,S,Mi, j ,Ii,I j,y1i, j ,{Ii,I j,Mi, j ,NBi, j
} KS j [ at b1i, j dest { s2i, j } ] 〉.(ν MSGi, j ) (S,I j,Mi, j ;y2i, j ,y3i, j ). decrypt y3i, j
as {NBi, j ;yki, j } KS j [ at b2i, j orig { s4i, j } ] in 〈I j,Ii,Mi, j ,y2i, j 〉.〈I j,Ii,{MSGi, j }
yki, j [ at b3i, j dest { a3i, j } ] 〉.0)
|
(|iinR∪{0} | jinS∪{0} !(ν Ki, j ) (I j,S,Mi, j ,Ii,I j;z1i, j ,z2i, j ). decrypt z1i, j as {Ii,I j,Mi, j
;znai, j } KSi [ at s1i, j orig { a1i, j } ] in decrypt z2i, j as {Ii,I j,Mi, j ;znbi, j } KS j [ at
s2i, j orig { b1i, j } ] in 〈S,I j,Mi, j ,{znai, j ,Ki, j } KSi [ at s3i, j dest { a2i, j } ] ,{znbi, j
,Ki, j } KS j [ at s4i, j dest { b2i, j } ] 〉.0))
Table 5.14: Meta-LySa Model of Otway Rees including illegitimate principals
As must be expected at this point, all pretence of security is dropped with every
message part deemed not confidential and every crypto-point assertion broken.
Violation of authentication properties (ψ)
(a1, CPDY), (a1, s2), (b1, CPDY), (b1, s1), (b3, a3), (b3, CPDY), (CPDY, a2),
(CPDY, a3), (CPDY, b2), (CPDY, s1), (CPDY, s2), (s3, a2), (s3, b2), (s3, CPDY)
(s4, a2), (s4, b2), (s4, CPDY),

Chapter 6
Automatic Generation of Protocol
Implementation
6.1 Introduction
In this section we introduce the companion tool to Elyjah, named Hajyle (pronounced
Hayley, and spelt like Elyjah backwards). It has been said that the biggest mistake
which one can make when dealing with protocols is to attempt to write your own. If
this is so, it makes sense to use an existing protocol which has already been analysed
and approved. Being able to translate a validated LySa model of a protocol into a
working implementation will help to reduce the number of errors made by developers
attempting to implement a specification. Hajyle performs the inverse actions to Elyjah
and automatically generates JaLAPI-based Java implementations of LySa code. While
it is our belief that the translation performed by Elyjah is the more valuable by also
having Hajyle the two tools form a symbiotic relationship as seen in Figure 6.1.
A big flaw in only having a Hajyle-like specification-to-implementation tool is that
a developer could not make any changes to the generated program code and be con-
fident that it is still a valid implementation of the specification. By having a tool like
Elyjah developers can continue to make changes and receive assurances as to the secu-
rity properties of the implementation.
Additionally the tools can together be used to validate the consistency of the trans-
lations. Namely, by starting with a LySa model and then using Hajyle followed by
Elyjah on the generated Java file the resulting LySa file should be equivalent to the
original. The same will not necessarily be true if starting and finishing with Java as
certain details such as variable names will be lost when converting between Java and
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Figure 6.1: Elyjah - Hajyle relationship
LySa so these names have to be automatically generated as part of Hajyle’s process.
Despite these minor differences the two Java programs will implement the same pro-
tocol.
6.2 Requirements of the Hajyle Software
The chief requirement of Hajyle is that it generates accurate Java implementations of
the supplied LySa protocols. In order that we can use Elyjah to validate this translation,
and indeed any changes made to the generated file, Hajyle should produce Elyjah-
compatible implementations which use JaLAPI wherever possible. This provides the
added benefit of simplifying the produced code so that it is easier to understand and
a developer can more easily make any amendments without disturbing the protocol-
related parts if they do not desire to do so.
Connected to this is the requirement that the produced Java programs should be
fully runnable without any further modification from the developer. Developers should
be able to make careful changes to the code and additionally to make changes to the
JaLAPI implementation. Obviously this may break the program but it is left to the
developer to make these mistakes on their own.
Speed is not so much a priority for Hajyle as it is for Elyjah as the normal use of
this tool would be for it to be used once in a development cycle to create a skeleton
prototype code that would then be amended and checked using Elyjah. Despite this,
Elyjah has shown that very quick translation in the opposite direction is possible so we
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aim for similar performance from Hajyle.
Hajyle is designed to work with standard LySa models that explicitly state protocol
and key names and do not use bi-directional principal names such as those seen intro-
duced in Section 5.7.2. Meta-LySa models which only add definitions of the principal
numbers to the deployment scenario as in Section 5.7.1 are processed by dropping the
Meta-LySa annotations and generating Java based on the plain LySa model that is left.
While it is possible to add Meta-LySa annotation to LySa models by converting
a LySa model to Java using Hajyle and then using Elyjah to generate a Meta-LySa
model, it is a rather inelegant solution and could best be described as an un-documented




Hajyle uses the same LySa parser created for the LySa Toolkit in Eclipse presented in
Section 3.1.
The first task Hajyle undertakes is to identify all the keys used in the protocol. We
use the same technique described in Section 4.2 to accomplish this. This does mean
that any protocol which establishes and shares a key but never uses it for encryption
is not perceived to be a key by Hajyle but instead a plain message part. However as
Section 5.6.2 notes, it is worth appending such a message exchange in the LySa model
so that the LySatool can analyse the confidentiality of this communication and whether
there are any violations of crypto-points.
The next task is to match up all send processes with the corresponding receive pro-
cess. This allows Hajyle to create a mapping between what the different principals call
the same objects. For example in the following LySa model principal A and principal
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6.3.2 Generating Set Up Class
The final task before analysing each principal is to identify the roots of each principal
and determine the name of the principal. This is done by looking through the model
for a send or receive process and taking the first part of the tuple, the sender. We also
examine any keys shared with all principals before the protocol begins. We use all
this information to construct the set up class. We start by initialising the Principal
classes used to model the LySa principals. Firstly the name of the Java file we are
going to be using is determined by taking the file-name of the LySa file, removing the
“.lysa” suffix and changing the rest of the name to lowercase except for the first letter.
Our class file-names are then constructed from this name appended with the principal
name. We then append the code to initiate and register these classes with a Network.
Finally we have to detect any new keys established before the protocol begins. The
appropriate generate method code is appended to create a key variable and use the
shareKey method in the Network class to register the key with all principals. Finally
we start the threads using the class’s start method, this has to occur after any keys
have been shared with all principals.
6.3.3 Generating Principal classes
Having already identified the principal roots in order to determine principal names we
analyse each principal in turn starting with the root node. The first task is to construct
the method header and standard code used to initiate a global variable for the Network
object and create a constructor method which fills this variable.
It must then be determined if there is a requirement for a run method in this class.
To do this, the LySa process is examined to find out whether a send or a receive process
comes first. If a send process comes first, then this class requires a run method which
sends this first message and creates any required keys or other message parts.
Following this we generate the processIncoming method and close the class.
6.3.3.1 Creating the run Method
There are two process types that need to be encapsulated in a run method, processes
relating to the ν operator and any send processes that come before a receive process.
The ν processes are worked out first by finding all LySa processes involving the new
keyword. These may either be keys or message parts such as a nonce or secret infor-
mation. As part of our preliminary task we already identified the names of keys and
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also a matching of received variables to sent information. This allows us to determine
whether the variable being created in the LySa process is used as a key in the current
principal or another one after it has been sent. If the variable is a key then we create ei-
ther a symmetrical key or asymmetrical keypair and register this key with the key store.
If the variable is not a key then we create a new variable and use the JaLAPI method
generateMessage so that if the generated code is later supplied to Elyjah, the output
file will feature the LySa ν process. However, this may not be an accurate notion of the
protocol’s intent, for example the variable may actually be a random nonce or indeed a
key that is not used to encrypt or decrypt anything in the protocol. These are situations
where it is impossible or at least foolish to try to divine any further information from
the LySa model.
After initiating any variables required, the Java code representing a LySa send pro-
cess can be created. For each LySa node SendProcess, Hajyle creates a new Message
object with a unique variable name. Each child of the SendProcess node represents a
message part to be added to the new Message object. The first two nodes represent the
sender and receiver in LySa so we ignore these and for each of the remaining nodes, we
determine whether we are dealing with a key, a message part or an encrypted message
block. If we are adding a key then we have to insert Java code to retrieve the correct
Key from the keystore, storing it in a variable which we then turn into a String via
JaLAPI’s sendKey method. If the message part we are adding is neither a key nor
an encrypted block then we must determine if this is a variable which has some value
previously assigned to it or a constant such as a name. We do this by determining if the
message part has previously appeared in a ν process or as part of the variable instanti-
ation phase of a receive process. If so then this message part is a previously assigned
variable and should be appended in the Java code as such or is a constant which will
be added in quotes. The final option is that we are adding an encrypted portion. This
is assembled much like a send process, beginning with creating a new Message object
for the encrypted portion. Then each message part is processed in turn as either a key,
message part or encrypted portion. Once the Message object has been populated, the
additional step of encrypting it is performed. Firstly the correct key is retrieved from
the keystore then we invoke the parent Message object’s add method with the param-
eter of the returned text of an encrypt method call with our new Message and Key
object. If crypto-points were present on the encryption these are added as parameters
to the encrypt method call. This process is summarised in Figure 6.2.
Once the Message object is fully constructed we append the Java code to send the





























Figure 6.2: Add Message Part Flowchart
message to the correct principal, namely the second tuple in the LySa model.
6.3.3.2 Creating the processIncoming Method
Like the run method, dealing with the processIncoming method starts with con-
structing the correct Java method header and starting the switch statement. We then
search for each receive process and for each one we find we find all new, decrypt or
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send processes between the previous receive process and the receive/principal. We cre-
ate a switch block for each of these process blocks. The LySa process for receiving a
message is split into two parts, one for constants which are checked against expected
values and one for variable instantiation. Starting with the receive process we construct
the Java for checking message parts. The first two tuples have been reserved for the
sender and the receiver so we append the JaLAPI getSource and getDest methods
and the JaLAPI getNext method for dealing with the remaining constants. For the
variable instantiation, we have to additionally check whether the incoming message
part is a key. If so instead of storing the message part in a string, we determine the type
of key and use the correct JaLAPI receive Key method to convert the String represen-
tation into the correct format. This Key is then registered with the key store using the
name of the message part in the LySa process.
Unlike encryption which is handled within a send process, decryption in LySa is a
disjoint process which occurs after the encrypted string has been stored in a variable.
Firstly the required Key is retrieved from the keystore and a uniquely named Message
object is created and populated with the JaLAPI decrypt method which takes in an
encrypted message block as a String and a Key and returns a populated Message
object. If the LySa decrypt process had crypto-point annotations then these are cap-
tured in the Java as additional parameters to the decrypt method. If the annotation for
the origin of the encrypted message is a list then an ArrayList object is created and
populated accordingly. Much like encryption is similar to assembling a message, the
process of decryption is very similar to processing an incoming message. The only real
difference is that there is no checking of source or destination for the Message. Aside
from this constant checking and variable instantiation is handled exactly the same as
an incoming message.
At this point, the techniques employed in Section 6.3.3.1 are employed again to
generate the Java for the ν, and send processes.
6.4 Worked Examples
6.4.1 Simple Symmetric Encryption
In order to show an overview of this tool we will present a simple example where
two principals already share a symmetric key and use this to send a message securely
between them. We have to generate some overhead Java code for the setup of the
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(ν K) (
(ν msg)〈A,B,{msg}K [at a dest {b}]〉.0
|
(A,B;x). decrypt x as {;y}K [at b orig {a}] in 0
)
Table 6.1: LySa Model of Simple Symmetric Encryption protocols
protocols. Hajyle generates the Java code for initialising two principals like the code
written in Section 5.6.1 so all that is left is to generate the Java code that implements
the LySa (ν K) process. Looking through the rest of the protocol it is clear that K is
a key as it is used to both encrypt and later decrypt part of a message. Thus we use
the JaLAPI method to generate a symmetric key and then store it in both principal’s
key store. To do this succinctly Hajyle uses the JaLAPI network’s object shareKey
method.
Sec re tKey K = g e n e r a t e S h a r e d K e y ( ) ;
n e t . shareKey (K, ”K” ) ;
a . s t a r t ( ) ;
b . s t a r t ( ) ;
The next line of Java code is the start of the protocol. For this reason it is placed
in principal A’s run method. Firstly it is determined that the LySa (ν msg) process
does not represent the creation of a new key so we use the JaLAPI generateMessage
method. In this scenario, this is the correct move, however if msg was to be used as
a nonce, Hajyle would not be able to realise this. Hajyle then initialises two Message
objects one for the variable msg containing the protocol’s secret communication and
one for storing the encrypted representation of this first Message.
p u b l i c vo id run ( ) {
msg = g e n e r a t e M e s s a g e ( ”MESSAGE” ) ;
Message message = new Message ( ) ;
Message e n c r y p t e d P a r t = new Message ( ) ;
e n c r y p t e d P a r t . add ( msg ) ;
Sec re tKey key 2 = ( Sec re tKey ) getKey ( ”K” ) ;
message . add ( e n c r y p t ( e n c r y p t e d P a r t , key 2 , ” a ” , ” b ” ) ) ;
/ / Send message
n e t . send ( ”B” , message ) ;
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}
The final line in the LySa model is implemented in the processIncoming method
of principal B. Due to the structured nature of the JaLAPI code, Hajyle can insert
automatically generated comments.
p u b l i c vo id p r o c e s s I n c o m i n g ( Message msg ) {
s w i t ch ( receivedNum ) {
cas e 0 :
receivedNum ++;
/ / Check c l a i m e d s o u r c e
check ( msg . g e t S o u r c e ( ) , ”A” ) ;
/ / Check i n t e n d e d d e s t i n a t i o n
check ( msg . g e t D e s t ( ) , ”B” ) ;
/ / Check message c o n t e n t s
/ / Add v a r i a b l e i n s t a n t i a t i o n
x = msg . g e t N e x t ( ) ;
/ / Decryp t message p a r t s ( 1 )
Sec re tKey key 2 = ( Sec re tKey ) getKey ( ”K” ) ;
Message d e c r y p t e d = d e c r y p t ( x , key 2 , ” b ” , ” a ” ) ;





In order to examine any differences between hand-written protocols and the imple-
mentations that Hajyle generates we re-examine the Otway-Rees protocol last seen in
Section 5.6.2. Indeed, we will be using the LySa generated by Elyjah which was pre-
sented in Table 5.10 so that the output of Hajyle may be as close to the original input
to Elyjah as possible.
The first difference is in the set up class, while in our original code we used the
principal’s shareKey method to register the symmetric keys with the principals Hajyle
uses the shareKey method from the Network object. This makes for simpler Java
code, sharing a key only requires this one JaLAPI method invocation to register the
key with principal’s key store. This does result in more principals having access to the
key than the developer may wish but is, in truth, a more accurate representation of the
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LySa model.
Handwritten Code Hajyle-Generated Code
Sec re tKey keyA = g e n e r a t e S h a r e d K e y ( ) ;
Sec re tKey keyB = g e n e r a t e S h a r e d K e y ( ) ;
a . shareKey ( keyA , ”KAS” ) ;
s . shareKey ( keyA , ”KAS” ) ;
b . shareKey ( keyB , ”KBS” ) ;
s . shareKey ( keyB , ”KBS” ) ;
Sec re tKey KBS = g e n e r a t e S h a r e d K e y ( ) ;
n e t . shareKey (KBS, ”KBS” ) ;
Sec re tKey KAS = g e n e r a t e S h a r e d K e y ( ) ;
n e t . shareKey (KAS, ”KAS” ) ;
Another difference between the two is that Hajyle treats the session counter M as a
constant as the protocol makes it clear all participants know this message part before
the protocol starts. Hayjle also uses the JaLAPI generateMessage method instead of
the correct generateNonce method for the nonces NA and NB. As explained before,
this is because LySa uses the same process for both.
Handwritten Code Hajyle-Generated Code
NA = g e n e r a t e N o n c e ( ) ;
Message v = new Message ( ) ;
v . add (M) ;
v . add ( ”A” ) ;
v . add ( ”B” ) ;
Message vEncoded = new Message ( ) ;
Sec re tKey keyAS = ( Sec re tKey ) getKey ( ”KAS” ) ;
vEncoded . add ( ”A” ) ;
vEncoded . add ( ”B” ) ;
vEncoded . add (M) ;
vEncoded . add (NA) ;
v . add ( e n c r y p t ( vEncoded , keyAS , ” a1 ” , ” s1 ” ) ) ;
n e t . send ( ”B” , v ) ;
NA = g e n e r a t e M e s s a g e ( ”MESSAGE” ) ;
Message message = new Message ( ) ;
message . add ( ”M” ) ;
message . add ( ”A” ) ;
message . add ( ”B” ) ;
Message e n c r y p t e d P a r t = new Message ( ) ;
e n c r y p t e d P a r t . add ( ”A” ) ;
e n c r y p t e d P a r t . add ( ”B” ) ;
e n c r y p t e d P a r t . add ( ”M” ) ;
e n c r y p t e d P a r t . add (NA) ;
Sec re tKey key 2 = ( Sec re tKey ) getKey ( ”KAS” ) ;
message . add ( e n c r y p t ( e n c r y p t e d P a r t , key 2 , ” a1 ” , ” s1 ” ) ) ;
/ / Send message
n e t . send ( ”B” , message ) ;
Aside from these differences which are consistent throughout the code, there are no
further differences between the handwritten code and the code generated by Hajyle.
Indeed both have the same Java trace when run. Additionally, by running Elyjah on
both of these files returns the same LySa model introduced in Table 5.10. This supports
our hypothesis that converting a protocol model into Java and back into LySa returns
the original model.
6.5 Performance
Although the performance aspect of Hajyle is less crucial than it is for Elyjah, it is
still reassuring to know that the process is quick enough that that it will not delay
development in any way. The table below shows the times for Hajyle to generate
Java implementations for the same protocols as seen in Section 5.5.1. Differences in
line counts to these handwritten programs can be attributed to various comments, line
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breaks or syntactical differences such as whether a Message object was encrypted and
added to the parent Message in two separate lines of code or the encrypt method
invocation being called as the parameter for the add method.
Protocol Generated Implementation Timings
LoC Messages Principals Hajyle
Needham-Schroder 227 6 3 0.046s
Otway-Rees 222 5 3 0.044s
Wide Mouth Frog 144 3 3 0.031s




In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 we presented a pair of tools that allow a developer to
translate between a Java implementation and a LySa representation of a cryptographic
protocol. In this Chapter we examine the relationship between our chosen languages.
The fundamental problem faced when attempting to discuss the equivalences be-
tween Java programs and LySa models is that while LySa is a context specific language
designed for the sole task of modelling cryptographic protocols, Java is a general pur-
pose programming language. This means that each LySa process takes multiple lines
of code when implemented in Java. The act of implementation itself adds further lines
of code to a Java program. LySa models do not specify implementation details such as
the encryption algorithm or the communication method while these details are required
in the Java. Luckily much of this information can be hidden inside the implementation
of JaLAPI and does not take up space in the protocol implementation file. This addi-
tionally fits with the concept of black-box encryption as espoused by process calculi
like LySa.
We start by deconstructing LySa processes in order to break them down into the
individual steps that JaLAPI can accomplish. As a starting point we use the LySa
reduction rules presented in Figure 7.1 as originally defined in [21].
Section 7.2 then gives a formalisation of JaLAPI method invocations using oper-
ational semantic rules. Together with the correspondence diagrams in Section 7.1 we
can then construct operational semantic rules for Java implementations of LySa models
which mirror those in Figure 7.1.
The diagrams in Section 7.1 show how combining several rules allow us to equate
LySa processes with JaLAPI. Transitions between LySa terms or multiple-part JaLAPI
transitions are on the right and these are broken up into sequences of abstract transitions
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which are shown on the left. As the LySa terms are much more concise than Java
programs, LySa processes are broken up into several sub-diagrams. Also in these
situations, the more general rule is on the right and the detailed break-down on the
left. This will demonstrate that the transition systems of these two formalisations are








The desired relationship between the JaLAPI and LySa Transition Systems represented
in the diagrams in this chapter by the ≈ symbol can be defined as preserving these
rules:
• If we have Java program J, whose translation Ely jah(J) has security properties P
as reported by LySatool(Ely jah(J)) then execution of J will also have properties
P.
• If we have Java program J, whose translation Ely jah(J) has protocol narration
N as reported by AnaLySa(Ely jah(J)) then execution of J will exhibit protocol
narration N.
• If we have LySa model L, which has security properties P as reported by LySatool(L)
then translation Ha jyle(L) will also have properties P.
• If we have LySa model L, which has protocol narration N as reported by AnaLySa(L)
then translation Ha jyle(L) will exhibit protocol narration N.
7.1 LySa - JaLAPI Relations
7.1.1 ANEW and NEW Rules
The simplest LySa rules to express with JaLAPI are the LySa NEW and ANEW rules
for generating new message parts or keys. The NEW rule is used to create new keys,
nonces and message parts while the ANEW rule is exclusively used for generating
asymmetric key pairs. To achieve this process with JaLAPI is a multi-step procedure.
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COM

















(ν n)P → (ν n)P′
ANEW
P → P′





P ≡ P′′ P′′ → P′′′ P′′′ ≡ P′
P → P′
Figure 7.1: The reduction relation P→ P’.
JaLAPI has a method to generate a Java KeyPair object which itself has methods
for retrieving corresponding private and public keys. Additionally, as mentioned when
discussing Elyjah and Hajyle, we require keys to be registered with a keystore such that
there is a fixed name which is used to refer to keys in a LySa model. Thus in order to
replicate the LySa ANEW rule there must be several method calls; generating the pair,
taking either the public or private key and then registering the key with the keystore. In
this instance it is not necessary for both paths to be followed as it is entirely possible
that only one of the keys is needed in a Java implementation although it is possible that
both key parts will be used. This is shown in the following diagram.
In this and subsequent diagrams we use a normal arrow when the process cannot
be broken down into several Java instructions. Equally we use a double arrow to de-
note that the arrow signifies several combined processes that will be explained later.
A dotted arrow indicates “and so forth” in the same manner that an ellipsis does in
mathematical notation.




KeyPair kp = generateKeyPair(1024);
PrivateKey key = kp.getPrivate(); PublicKey key = kp.getPublic();
registerKey(key, "K-"); registerKey(key, "K+");
ANEW K
ANEW
In an effort to simplify these diagrams we introduce a labelling system for transi-
tions. These labels borrow syntactically from both LySa and Java where appropriate.
Conciseness is the key aim in generating these labels so when LySa provides a syn-
tactic framework applicable for the purpose of a rule this was used. For this reason,
we use a variation of the LySa ν process for new objects. We use the label νK ± kp
instead of the full generateKeyPair method call. For retrieving a key from a key
pair we use Java-like variable-assignment syntax coupled with representing public and
private keys with + and - characters, for example, key = kp− assigns kp− to key. For
adding a new tuple to the keystore we use the ] character, for example KS] (key,k)
registers key K in the keystore under the name key. These simple labels show both the






key = kp− key = kp+
KS] (key,K−) KS] (key,K+)
ANEW K
ANEW
The difficulty when attempting to represent the more general NEW rule with JaLAPI
methods is that there are several possible meanings to the LySa process (ν x). It is not
clear whether the generated x is a key, a nonce or simply a plain string. There are
7.1. LySa - JaLAPI Relations 107
JaLAPI method calls for generating each of these message parts which shall be repre-
sented by the labels νK, νN and νS respectively. Assuming the item is a key then as






νS x νN x
NEW
7.1.2 COM Rule
We continue by trying to capture the rules required to express the LySa notion of
communication as given in the LySa reduction rule COM in Figure 7.1.
〈V1, ...,Vk〉.P1|(V1, ...,Vj;x j+1, ...,xk).P2 → P1|P2[x j+1
α7→Vj+1, ...,xk
α7→Vk]
The LySa process that this rule represents embodies message creation, composition
and communication in one process. This process is split over multiple method invoca-
tions in Java code. The COM rule can be thought of in three distinct phases, message
composition, communication and processing of the incoming message. The distinc-
tion is slightly unclear as composing and sending a message as well as receiving and







< V1, ...,Vk > .P1
P1
(V1, ...,Vj;x j+1, ...,xk).P2
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Equivalent pseudo-Java-code for these two processes is shown below.
run() processIncoming()
Message m = new Message {} ;
m. add (V1 ) ;
. . .
m. add (Vk ) ;
check ( msg . g e t S o u r c e ( ) , V1 ) ;
check ( msg . g e t D e s t ( ) , V2 ) ;
check ( msg . g e t N e x t ( ) , V3 ) ;
. . .
check ( msg . g e t N e x t ( ) , V j ) ;
S t r i n g x j+1 = msg . g e t N e x t ( ) ;
. . .
S t r i n g xk = msg . g e t N e x t ( ) ;
7.1.2.1 Message Creation and Composition
Message creation in JaLAPI means creating a new Message object and adding message
parts individually. For an n element message, it thus takes at minimum n + 1 method
calls to express using JaLAPI. Following the convention introduced in Section 7.1.1 we
use a variation of the LySa ν process to denote the generation of a new Message object,
in this instance M is appended to the ν character. We use Java syntax for representing
adding elements to the Message. As this process has many possible implementations
we use a double arrow to signify it can be broken into child processes. We will present











There are additional processes used, for example, in the case where the message
part is a Key. This means that adding a message part to a Message object is a more
complicated procedure than it might at first appear. The potential options available are
either we are adding a String, be it a literal, variable or an encrypted block; or we
want to add a Key. This key must be first retrieved from the keystore and converted
into a transmissible format for communication. In Section 7.1.1 we presented the
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label for adding items a keystore: KS] (key,K). The label for retrieval has a similar
format with the ] label replaced with an arrow denoting the key and label coming from
the keystore. There are two options for then adding a Key to a Message. Although
semantically identical they differ in syntax. Either the key is converted to a String in
one line and this String added to a Message or by using the sendKey method directly
as the parameter for the add method. When adding elements to a Message we use the
following concise Java-like syntax to describe adding an element x to a Message m:
m+ = x. Finally we have the notation K(x) to describe a Key which is in a transmissible
format. For example m+ = K(key) means adding a String representation of a Key key






m+ = Vi m.add Vi
m.add Vi
7.1.2.2 Sending and Receiving Messages
In the COM diagram in Section 7.1.2 we label one of the transitions as send. This is a
two-part process, in our source principal the JaLAPI send method is called and in our
destination principal we have the method header for the processIncoming method.
The label for our send transition denotes a message, m, being sent to a principal B. The
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7.1.2.3 Process Received Message
In LySa, the receipt of a message happens at the same time as message processing.
This processing is achieved by pattern-matching on one section of the message and
variable instantiation on the latter. This process is illustrated by the com.chk+Bnd m
diagram. Additionally in LySa, it is typical for the first two elements of a message to
be the source and destination. In our implementation these are automatically appended
to messages in the send process. There exist JaLAPI methods for checking the source,
destination and subsequent message parts. Checking the content of the message is
done one tuple at a time. The transition labels for these JaLAPI method calls take the
form of comparison statements for Java primitive types. We use the notation m−− to
represent removing a tuple from a Message m in a FIFO sequence to allow processing






















As detailed in the com.Chk+Bnd m diagram, after checking the first half of the message
variable binding then takes place in a similar manner to the previous message checking.
Each subsequent message part is checked in turn as seen in bndMsg m. The incoming
message part could potentially be a standard message part such as a principal name or
nonce, an encrypted portion or a string representation of a key. In this instance the key
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7.1.3 Encryption
Encrypted message parts are a base LySa term that are used in message composition.
In order to implement this in Java with JaLAPI, we have to construct a new Message
object and add elements to this Message. Additionally the required key has to be
retrieved from the keystore. Only when both of these steps have been accomplished
can the encryption itself be performed. The diagram below makes it clear that the
two required steps can be performed in any order, although in fact the more general
scenario is applicable where the key retrieval can be performed at any point during the
ongoing process of preparing the message block. We use the LySa encryption notation
for the transition label of the JaLAPI encrypt method, meanwhile we have already
shown the breakdown for how a Message is generated and how a key is retrieved from
the keystore. The generated String can then be added to a Message so it can be sent to
another principal. The process for asymmetrical encryption or generating a signature










The LySa rules featured in Figure 7.1 include the variations of a standard decryption
process. These rules feature built in encryption in a manner not used in actual LySa
models. The SDEC rule, for example, would typically be found in a scenario such as:
〈{V1, ...,Vk}V0〉.P1 | (;x0) . decrypt x0 as {V1, ...,Vj;x j+1, ...,xk}V0 in P2
→ P1 | P2[x j+1
α7→Vj+1, ...,xk
α7→Vk]
However, it is clear that the rules as presented in Figure 7.1 are much more concise.
Rather than repeat ourselves we shall focus on the decryption portion, for example
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SDEC
decrypt x0 as {V1, ...,Vj;x j+1, ...,xk}V0 in P → P[x j+1
α7→Vj+1, ...,xk
α7→Vk]
where we take as given that x0 has the form {V1, ...,VK}V0 . The diagram below
shows the deconstructed JaLAPI decryption process. The first stage is retrieval of a
key from the keystore. The decryption itself takes place next which converts a String
into a Message object. The label for this transition borrows from Java as with the
built-in pattern matching, the LySa syntax for decryption is longer. The JaLAPI pattern
matching then takes place over the generated Message. The check portion is similar
to that of incoming messages but does not check source and destination first. Variable
































The breakdown for both ADEC and ASIG are identical, only using the correct key to
represent the relevant rule.
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7.2 Formalisation of JaLAPI
We want to show that the same protocol can be described as both a LySa model and a
Java program using JaLAPI. Thus when trying to define the formalisation that allows
us to reason about our equivalences, what we want to capture is the formalisation
of JaLAPI. While there exist formalisations of the Java language and the JVM they
are too low-level to be useful to us for our purposes here. In order to demonstrate the
ability of JaLAPI to implement LySa models we present reduction rules for the JaLAPI
methods.
The rules take the standard form of requirements on the top, code and outcome on
the bottom. In order to accurately describe the scenario we have four semantic objects,
a context, a state, a network and a keystore. The context, Γ, is a list of type assertions
that describes the type of various objects in the scenario. To say that an object m has
type Message in the scenario the requirement reads, Γ ` {m 7→ Message}. If a line
of Java creates a new object, m2 with the type Message we can build a new context
Γ] {m2 7→ Message}. We have a simple typing hierarchy used to encapsulate the
relationships between messages and their contents.
Message
List of MsgPart objects
MsgPart
String
String representation of Key
EncMsg
Another semantic object we deal with is the state of the objects, S, which records
what their content is at a particular time, as a simple mapping. To say that a Message
m has content (c) which is a triple with three elements, w, x and y, we would say
S(m) = (c : {w,x,y}). If a rule makes a change to the state of an object, for example
adding a further element z to the end of this message the new state which results from
this is S[m := c : {w,x,y,z}]. Simultaneous updates to the state are written as S[v :=
w, m := c : {x,y,z}]. The previous example demonstrates the difference in discussing
MsgPart and Message objects. With MsgPart objects the state of the objects is given
as v := w. With a Message object we give the contents of the message as a list like
m := c : {x,y,z}.
When discussing communication we also need to discuss the contents of a Net-
work, N. When messages are transmitted over the network extra fields are needed
114 Chapter 7. Elucidation of Formalisation
for source and destination, thus adding a new message to the network looks like
N@(s : A,d : B,c : {x,y,z}).
The final semantic object we have is a keystore, KS. The syntax for adding and
retrieving keys is the same as the syntax for the context thus to add a new key with
the label K we write KS] {(k,K)} and to check that there is a key with that label
KS ` {(k,K)}.
When the action a particular rule is formalising does not affect one of these seman-
tic objects we do not include that semantic object in the rule. This simplifies the rule
and additionally allows you, the reader, to easily see the effect of the action.
7.2.1 KeyGeneration Class
We now present formal rules of the methods presented in Section 5.3. The first class we
introduced was the KeyGeneration class which featured methods for generating either
a SecretKey or a KeyPair. We shall start by examining the method for generating
a SecretKey, named generateSharedKey. This method creates a new object and
initialises the state of this object although it does not involve either the keystore or the
Network. We will thus concern ourselves exclusively with the semantic objects Γ and
S.
We use the preconditions of this rule to denote that the method generateSharedKey
constructs a Key. The result of this rule is that the context is appended with a new ob-
ject of type Key. The state of this object is also set signifying that the content of this




(Γ,S) ` SecretKey key = generateSharedKey() -
νK key
(Γ]{key 7→ Key},S[key := k])
For the method generateKeyPair we note that this method generates a tuple of
keys, K+ and K-. Much like CREATEKEY the context and state are updated to reflect
the new object being of type KeyPair and consisting of a tuple of accompanying keys.
CREATEKEYPAIR
generateKeyPair(1024) = {K+,K−}
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We now have to provide formalisations for method calls that are not part of JaLAPI
but are a part of Java’s built in crypto functions. These are the methods for extracting
the public and private keys from a KeyPair object. For this method call to succeed there
needs to be an already generated KeyPair object which consists of a pair of keys. After
the method invocation the context must be updated to reflect the creation of a new key
object. Depending on whether the getPublic or getPrivate method is called, the
state of this new key is either the public or private key from the KeyPair tuple. This
can be more formally expressed in the two rules below.
CREATEPRIVATEKEY
Γ ` {keypair 7→ KeyPair} S(keypair) = { ,x}
(Γ,S) ` PrivateKey key = keypair.getPrivate() -
key=keypair−
(Γ]{key 7→ Key},S[key := x)
CREATEPUBLICKEY
Γ ` {keypair 7→ KeyPair} S(keypair) = {x, }
(Γ) ` PublicKey key = keypair.getPublic() -
key=keypair+
(Γ]{key 7→ Key},S[key := x])
7.2.2 Message Class
We now examine the rules for creating and populating a message. This task has been
made easier by using a bespoke Message object as we can restrict the methods of
accessing the content of the message. The rule for the Message constructor is given
below. It has no preconditions and creates a new object in the same manner as the
rules in the previous section. We also see the first use of the formal specification of the
Message structure as we set the content of the message to the empty set.
NEWMESSAGE
(Γ,S) ` Message m = new Message() -
νM m
(Γ]{m 7→ Message},S[m := c : { /0}])
The next rule we shall examine adds elements to a Message object. Unlike the
previous rule, there are certain requirements and assumptions as to the situation before
the method call. The types of the objects are very important. The object we are trying
to add must be of type MsgPart as described in the above diagram. Equally the object
we are trying to add the message part to must be a Message object. As well as these
requirements on the context we must also make some assumptions about the state of
the message before we add any additional parts so that we can show the result of this
action.
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In this instance the context does not change but we append the new message part to
the end of the tuple showing the contents of the Message. To show this we present the
tuple as only having one element prior to the method call and an additional one with
the name of the variable we are adding afterwards.
MESSAGEADD
Γ ` {m 7→ Message,v 7→ MsgPart} S(m) = (c : {x})
(Γ,S) ` m.add(v) -
m+=v
(Γ,S[m := c : {x,v}])
We shall cover the methods which deal with accessing the Message in Section 7.2.4
where they are used along with the check method.
7.2.3 Network Class
Although the JaLAPI Network class as described in Section 5.3.4 has multiple meth-
ods, the only one that has an observable effect in LySa is the send method.
We use the formalisation of the Network semantic object introduced at the start of
Section 7.2 for the first time in this formalisation. In order to send a message we need
the source. This does not come from the method call but from the Network register
method invocations in the set-up class. We represent this here in the name of the
message rule with ‘A’ as a placeholder for the current principal and used as the source
attribute for the message in the following rule. The other preconditions that must be
satisfied for this rule are that the types of the objects are correct. We also say that the
message has a given content. As a consequence of this rule the Network is updated to
feature a message with the destination from the method call and the content taken from
the content of the Message object being added.
SEND(A)
Γ ` {m 7→ Message,net 7→ Network} S(m) = (c : {x,y,z})
(Γ,N,S) ` net.send(B,m) -
m→B
(Γ,N@(s : A,d : B,c : {x,y,z}),S)
7.2.4 Principal Class
The corresponding receive process to the just introduced send is not a method invo-
cation but the method header for the processIncoming method. The following rule
specifies the inverse of the above send and removes a message from the Network and
adds it to the context and state including having source and destination attributes set.
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RECEIVE(B)
N′ = (s : A,d : B,c : {x,y,z})@N
(Γ,N′,S) ` processIncoming(Message m) -
A→m
(Γ]{m 7→ Message},
N,S[m := s : A,d : B,c : {x,y,z}])
The next three rules are formalisations of variations on the check method using
the getSource, getDest and getNext methods from the Message class. Rather than
present separate rules for the check and get methods we simplify the situation by com-
bining these rules in the manner they will actually be used. The CHECKSOURCE and
CHECKDEST rules are nearly identical. The precondition for these rules state that
whichever attribute we are checking has the same value as the second parameter of the
check method.
CHECKSOURCE
Γ ` {m 7→ Message} S(m) = (s : A)




Γ ` {m 7→ Message} S(m) = (d : B)
(Γ,S) ` check(m.getDest(), B) -
B==m.d
(Γ,S)
The difference between these rules and the CheckPart rule below is that the content
of the Message is modified when checking individual message parts so that subsequent
method calls will not be accessing the same message part.
CHECKPART
Γ ` {m 7→ Message} S(m) = (c : {x,y,z})
(Γ,S) ` check(m.getNext(), x) -
x==m−−
(Γ,S[m := c : {y,z}])
The getNext method is used again for the second part of receiving a message;
variable instantiation. Although this does not involve any methods from the JaLAPI
principal class, we feature it in this section as it fits here better than in the Message
class. Like the previous CHECKPART rule, we state that as a consequence the mes-
sage’s contents are modified, In this instance the removed message part is stored in a
new variable.
VARIABLEASSIGNMENT
Γ ` {m 7→ Message} S(m) = (c : {x,y,z})
(Γ,S) ` String i = m.getNext() -
i=m−−
(Γ]{i 7→ MsgPart},S[m := c : {y,z}, i := x])
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At this point we have presented rules for composing, sending, receiving and pro-
cessing a message as well as generating keys. We now present the rules for using these
keys, starting with usage of the keystore, sending and receiving keys finishing with
formalisations of encryption and decryption. Elyjah and Hajyle both require keys to
be registered with a keystore so that there is a single name that can be used to identify
keys instead of using multiple variable names. We now present the rules for register-
ing and retrieving keys from this keystore. In order to register a key the object we are
attempting to store must be validated as a Key object. After running the method, the
keystore is appended with an additional tuple containing the aforementioned key and
a label.
REGISTERKEY
Γ ` {key 7→ Key}
(Γ,KS) ` registerKey(key,“K”) -
KS](key,K)
(Γ,KS]{(key,K)})
We also have the accompanying method for retrieving a key from the keystore. In
this instance the preconditions state that the keystore must contain a tuple containing a
key and a label.
GETKEY
KS ` {(k,KAB)}
(Γ,KS) ` SecretKey key = (SecretKey)keys.get(”KAB”) -
KS→(key,KAB)
(Γ]{key → Key},S[key := k])
When sending a key the sendKey method can be used in two different ways. These
reflect the options in the m.add Vi diagram in Section 7.1.2.1. Much like the labels for
the transitions we use the notation K(x) to denote that x is a Key in a String represen-
tation.
SENDKEY
Γ ` {m 7→ Message,key 7→ Key} S(m) = (c : {x})
(Γ,S) ` m.add(sendKey(key)) -
m+=K(key)
(Γ,S[m := (c : {x,K(key)})])
SENDKEY II
Γ ` {key 7→ Key}
(Γ,S) ` String k = sendKey(key) -
k=K(key)
(Γ]{k → String},S[k := K(key)])
As for receiving a message, due to the different algorithms used, there are different
methods for each key type. The rules presented below show the rules for all three types,
SecretKey, PublicKey and PrivateKey. In all of these rules a String representation
of a key is the first element in a Message. After the method is called, a new Key subtype
exists whose state is the key in normal form.
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RECEIVESECRETKEY
Γ ` {m 7→ Message} S(m) = (c : {K(x),y,z})




S[m := (c : {y,z})])
RECEIVEPUBLICKEY
Γ ` {m 7→ Message} S(m) = (c : {K(x),y,z})




S[m := (c : {y,z})])
RECEIVEPRIVATEKEY
Γ ` {m 7→ Message} S(m) = (c : {K(x),y,z})




S[m := (c : {y,z})])
For symmetric encryption and decryption the rules are mirror images of each other.
For encryption the preconditions state that there must be a Message with certain con-
tent and afterwards there is an EncMessage with the same content but encrypted with
a previously defined Key. The inverse is that there is an EncMessage with content
encrypted with a Key that generates a Message object with the same content but not
encrypted.
ENCRYPT
Γ ` {m 7→ Message,K 7→ Key} S(m) = (c : {x,y,z})
(Γ,S) ` String enc = encrypt(m,K) -
enc={m}K
(Γ]{enc 7→ EncMessage},S[enc := {x,y,z}K ])
DECRYPT
Γ ` {K 7→ Key,enc 7→ EncMessage} S(enc) = (c : {x,y,z}K)
(Γ,S) ` Message m = decrypt(enc,K) -
m=dec({m}K)
(Γ]{m 7→ Message},S[m := c : {x,y,z}])
Hashing is modelled in LySa by using asymmetrical encryption where the accom-
panying decryption key does not exist. The formalisation of the JaLAPI hash method
is provided below. Rather than the hashed block be modelled as an EncMessage a
String is used as this message should not be able to be decrypted.
HASH
Γ ` {msg 7→ Message} S(msg) = (c : {x,y,z})
(Γ,S) ` String h = hash(msg) -
h={msg}MD5+
(Γ]{h 7→ String},S[h := {x,y,z}MD5+])
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As an encrypted block will typically be added to another Message object to be sent
to another principal, there presents another scenario where the encrypt method is used
directly in an add method invocation.
ENCRYPT II
Γ ` {m 7→ Message,m2 7→ Message,K 7→ Key} S(m) = (c : {x,y,z}) S(m2) = (c : {a,b,c})
(Γ,S) ` m.add(encrypt(m2,K)) -
m+={m2}K
(Γ,S[m := {x,y,z,{a,b,c}K}])
Asymmetric encryption has exactly the same rule as symmetric encryption as it
does not matter whether a public, private or shared key is used. On the other hand
when one key is used for asymmetric encryption the other must be used for decryption.
ADECRYPT
Γ ` {K 7→ Key, enc 7→ EncMessage
keypair 7→ KeyPair}
S(enc) = (c : {x,y,z}K+)
S(keypair) = {K+,K−}
(Γ,S) ` Message m = decrypt(enc,K−) -
m=dec({m}K−)
(Γ]{m 7→ Message},S[m := c : {x,y,z}])
ASIGNATURE
Γ ` {K 7→ Key,enc 7→ EncMessage
keypair 7→ KeyPair}
S(enc) = (c : {x,y,z}K−)
S(keypair) = {K+,K−}
(Γ,S) ` Message m = decrypt(enc,K+) -
dec(m={m}K+)
(Γ]{m 7→ Message},S[m := c : {x,y,z}])
We have two more methods for generating message parts. The first, generateMessage
is used only to replicate LySa’s ν process for message parts. The second generateNonce
has more functionality and sets the new variable as a freshly generated nonce.
NEWSTRING






(Γ,S) ` String nonce = generateNonce() -
νN nonce
(Γ]{nonce 7→ String},S[nonce : n])
As a summary of which labels and rules relate to which method call we provide the
table in Table 7.2.4.
7.3 Case study
To show how these rules all fit together we will look at a very simple protocol and see
how the LySa and Java model and implement it. The standard narration is as follows:
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Rule Name Label Java Code
CREATEKEY νK key SecretKey key = generateSharedKey()
CREATEKEYPAIR νK± keypair KeyPair keypair = generateKeyPair(1024)
CREATEPRIVATEKEY key = keypair− PrivateKey key = keypair.getPrivate()
CREATEPUBLICKEY key = keypair+ PublicKey key = keypair.getPublic()
NEWMESSAGE νM m Message m = new Message()
MESSAGEADD m+ = v m.add(v)
SEND(A) m → B net.send(B, m)
RECEIVE(B) A → m processIncoming(Message m)
CHECKSOURCE A == m.S check(m.getSource(),A)
CHECKDEST A == m.D check(m.getDest(), A)
CHECKPART x == m−− check(m.getNext(), A)
VARIABLEASSIGNMENT i = m−− String i = m.getNext()
REGISTERKEY KS] (key,K) registerKey(key, "K")
GETKEY KS → (key,K) SecretKey key = (SecretKey)keys.get("K")
SENDKEY m+ = K(key) m.add(sendKey(key))
SENDKEY II k = K(key) String k = sendKey(key)
RECEIVESECRETKEY K(k) = m−− SecretKey k = receiveSecretKey(m.getNext())
RECEIVEPUBLICKEY K(k) = m−− PublicKey k = receivePublicKey(m.getNext())
RECEIVEPRIVATEKEY K(k) = m−− PrivateKey k = receivePrivateKey(m.getNext())
ENCRYPT enc = {m}k String enc = encrypt(m,k)
ENCRYPT II m+ = {m2}k m.add(encrypt(m2,k))
HASH h = {msg}MD5+ String h = hash(msg)
DECRYPT m = dec({enc}k) Message m = decrypt(enc,k)
ADECRYPT m = dec({enc}k−) Message m = decrypt(enc,k-)
ASIGNATURE m = dec({enc}k+) Message m = decrypt(enc,k+)
NEWSTRING νS msg String msg = generateMessage("msg")
NEWNONCE νN nonce String nonce = generateNonce()
Table 7.1: Summary of rules,labels and names
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A → B : K+
B → A : {msg}K+
The clear goal of this protocol is to allow secure communication between principals
A and B by having B’s message to A being encrypted. While this protocol has many
security flaws it is sufficient to demonstrate key generation, public key encryption and
decryption as well as communication between principals. The LySa code for this pro-
tocol is:
(ν ± K)〈A,B,K+〉.(B,A;msgToBeDecoded).
decrypt msgToBeDecoded as {|;msg|}K− [ at a1 orig { b1 } ] in 0
|
(ν message) (A,B;K).〈B,A,{|message|}K [ at b1 dest { a1 } ] 〉.0
This protocol can be broken up into the various rules we have presented in this
chapter. The first step is the creation of a new keypair. This process is described in both
the LySa reduction rule ANEW, and the accompanying rules presented in Section 7.2.1.
The next part of the protocol is sending a message from principal A to principal B.
This is covered in the LySa reduction COM rule but for the Java reduction rules this
has to be broken down in the following generalised steps. Principal A creates a new
message object and adds the public key from the previously generated key pair to it.
This process is formally described in the MKMSG and ADD diagrams. The message
is then sent to principal B. Principal B receives this message and checks the first two
elements in the message are the expected source and destination, this is detailed in
the COM.CHK section. It then binds the third element to a new variable, x, taking the
incoming String and transforming it into a Key object as pictured in the BNDMSG
diagram. Additionally a new String, msg, is created, formally described in the LySa
NEW rule which for reasons of brevity is left out of this paper. Principal B then creates
a new Message and adds to it the string representation of a new Message, which has
the previously created String msg added to it, encrypted with the variable x, which
was the Key sent by A. This message is sent to the protocol initiator, A, who checks the
first two elements are the expected source and destination and stores the third element
in a variable. This is the String representation of the encrypted message. A retrieves
the key pair’s private key and uses this to decrypt the message as detailed in the DEC
picture and rules.
The next page shows how the Java program for principal B is represented as a tree
of operational rules which match up with the following diagram showing a complete
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overview of the protocol. This demonstrates how the rules which correspond to LySa
processes expand and eventually terminate with Java statements using JaLAPI. This
Java code is extracted from the protocol implementation generated by running Hajyle
on the LySa code at the start of this section. Below is an overview of the entire protocol










com.chk +Bnd(x j+1 7→ msgToBeDecoded))
dec(msgToBeDecoded,K−)




In this section we have shown how a block of Java code relates to JaLAPI rules
leading to a complete transition system for the protocol. In the diagram above, the
typically unnamed nodes have been labelled to denote the states within the transition




mkMsg M2({|msg|}K)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (Γ′,S′) ` P12
The Java program J represented by this transition system should then preserve the
protocol narration and security properties of the original LySa model L according to
the ≈ relation as defined at the start of this chapter.














































































































































































































In this final chapter the work presented in this dissertation is summarised. To put this
work into context, related work is discussed in Section 8.1. Like the later sections we
divide the work into three distinct areas. LyTE and PAMeLA are discussed separately
from each other and Elyjah and Hajyle. Possible extensions to all of these distinct sec-
tions are provided in Section 8.2. Finally, to conclude the chapter and the dissertation
as a whole, a final discussion of the functionality of the work and the perceived larger
value is presented in Section 8.4.
8.1 Related Work
8.1.1 Work Related to LyTE
Examples of applications which provide visual representations of cryptographic pro-
tocols are ProtoViz[32], GRASP[72], GRACE[25] and TECP[81]. These tools are
primarily designed as education packages for teaching students about cryptographic
protocols. While LyTE would be more suitable for teaching students about process
calculi such as LySa, it could still be used to demonstrate cryptographic protocols by
a demonstrator familiar with LySa. Additionally, these other tools use their own lan-
guage for describing a protocol whereas LyTE uses the LySa language so the protocols
can be analysed for security flaws, which is an important point when teaching crypto-
graphic protocols.
The LyTE toolkit provided also owes a debt of inspiration to the PEPA Eclipse
Plugin [78] for some of the syntax highlighting and LyTeX ideas.
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8.1.2 Work Related to PAMeLa
A theoretical approach to performance evaluation for security protocols has already
been attempted in work such as [15]. This work relies on establishing a new extended
operational semantic for LySa in which each transition is assigned a label. Here we
provide an easy-to-use alternative that fits in with both the PEPA Eclipse Plug-in and
the LySa Toolkit in Eclipse (LyTE).
There is related work on performance modelling of concurrent systems [8] or non-
security protocols[27, 38] however the addition of cryptographic operations in this
work means there is significant separation between the analysis provided by these
works. As the input for PAMeLa is automatically generated from a LySa model no
extra knowledge or input language training is needed.
8.1.3 Work Related to Elyjah and Hajyle
There are many alternate methods for modelling and analysing cryptographic protocols
such as [22, 1, 63, 73, 49]. Equally, not all attempts at increasing program security
depend on cryptography. The work on proof-carrying code[52, 4] attaches machine-
checkable proofs of program properties instead of cryptographic certificates.
There are several examples of work related to Hajyle, where implementations of
protocols are generated from specifications or formal models. The following is not an
exhaustive list, merely those judged to be most closely related or inspirational to the
development of Hajyle.
COSP-J[28] is a protocol compiler that generates Java implementations of code
from an input script based on Casper[46]. In [41] a tool, ACG-C#, is detailed where
C# code is generated from a modified Casper script that is translated into CSP[40] and
then verified with the FDR tool[69]. The Java and C# that is generated has similar API
method calls to JaLAPI which suggests that our method is reasonable. A downside of
both of these tools is that the input is a slightly modified version of the Casper script
for which there is no automatic translation tool. This additional step seems to be a
potential source of errors that needs to be addressed.
The SPEARII framework first described in [70] details the reasons for providing
source code generation as part of a complete protocol suite. This was expanded in
[47]. The Protocol Code Generator takes information from two data specifications in
the SPEAR framework however all of this information is input via a graphical user
interface that appears to reduce the learning curve of the system. The generated code
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is also in the Java language.
Java code is also generated in work by Muller and Millen[48]. In this instance the
source language is the CAPSL intermediate language CIL. While this may appear to
be a problem regarding the equivalence of the protocol expressed in two languages as
protocol analysis is performed on the CIL representation there is no such problem. The
only way a problem may develop is if someone else was using a CAPSL representation
of a protocol to create another version of the protocol for interoperability reasons and
missed some of the vital information only contained in the CIL version.
Spi[1] is the source language for Spi2Java[67, 77, 64] which as the name suggests
translates into Java implementations. This is one of the more developed tools in the
field and is no doubt the inspiration for tools such as Expi2Java[23] and Spi2F#[76].
This work is most closely related to Hajyle as the Spi language is closely related to
LySa and the produced Java shares similar method calls. [64] contains a more complete
formalisation than we present in Chapter 7.
A different approach is taken in [74]. This work presents a toolkit named AGV I,
Automatic Generation,Veri f ication and Implementation o f Security Protocols where
a protocol designer inputs the specifications and requirements of a given scenario and
the toolkit generates several protocols that fit these requirements. These protocols can
then be checked and implemented in Java. While this is an intriguing option particu-
larly for those with zero experience with cryptographic protocols the ability to generate
traditional protocols for interoperability reasons is a necessary and powerful addition.
While analysing cryptographic protocols directly from source code seems to be
fairly new, there is other interesting work in the area. Jan Jürjens has written papers
detailing work on analysing Java [43] and C [44] implementations of cryptographic
protocols. This work relies on the developer adding annotations to the code which
are then validated against the program behaviour by run-time analysis. This makes it
ideally suited to analysing legacy code. Elyjah analyses the source code itself resulting
in less extra work for a developer creating a new implementation, however this method
does restrict Elyjah’s ability to analyse arbitrary code.
There is only a limited amount of directly related work in the area of code-to-
model verification. Relevant works are Goubault-Larrecq and Parrennest’s work [36]
on analysis on C code, which does not attempt to deduce cryptographic protocols from
the code but does analyse the reachability properties of the code. Also relevant is
work [66] by Poll and Schubert where they study an implementation of SSH in Java
using the specification language JML. The most closely related work is the Microsoft
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Research tool FS2PV [9] which translates F# programs to a low-level π calculus model.
This can then be analysed by ProVerif to provide security analysis of the implemen-
tation. The follow-up to this work [7] uses typing rules and dramatically reduces the
time needed for verification. The requirement in this work for special refinement types
is comparable to Elyjah requiring the use of a special API. In addition F# is not used
as much as the Java language that Elyjah is geared towards. This work has been shown
to work on larger examples than Elyjah has so far been subject to although the time
taken for protocols such as the Otway-Rees is close to two minutes whereas the static
analysis that Elyjah and the LySatool use means this analysis is less than a second.
ASPIER[26] represents impressive progress on analysing C code, however run
times are even higher than F7. The referenced paper gives an analysis time of over
4 and a half days for analysing secrecy properties in a protocol. Analysis of authenti-
cation takes additional time above this.
Irrespective of any technical differences, the work presented in this dissertation has
two clear advantages over this related work. Having complementary tools for both
model-to-code and code-to-model nullifies many of the arguments as to which direc-
tion is superior. The more developed field of code generation has a major drawback
in that the developer cannot be certain that any changes made preserve the security
properties of the original model. This means the implementation can only be said to
be based on a verified model and the verification cannot be used as part of any service
level agreement. While implementation analysis is starting to become a hot-topic most
of the work, including Elyjah, requires developers to do more work than they would if
they were not planning on analysing their work. This may include adding additional
annotations, using an unfamiliar API or even an unfamiliar language. Being able to
generate code from a model actually saves developers time rather than using up more
of theirs. This is powerful evidence is support of using a specialised language such as
LySa for modelling the protocol over a more general form of model checking such as
Horn clauses from which it is harder to recreate a protocol implementation.
Another advantage of the work presented here is that it is integrated into the Eclipse
Development Environment and analysis results can be achieved in a one-step process
so protocol analysis is more likely to be used by developers. If we are to note that
formal methods are currently underused by developers then we must expect that devel-
opers are equally unlikely to use any of these tools unless every conceivable effort is
made to make using such tools as natural as possible.
8.2. Future Work 129
8.2 Future Work
The most valuable extension to this work would be to achieve true model driven de-
velopment with Elyjah and Hajyle. Certain information is lost in translation from Java
to LySa, it would be beneficial if this information was restored if and when this LySa
model was used by Hajyle to generate code where possible. Ideally as much as possible
of this implementation would be kept despite changes to the LySa model.
JaLAPI can certainly be expanded with more API functions, perhaps including
nonce manipulation and even choice which would then need integration into the two
tools Elyjah and Hajyle. The syntax for incoming message switching could also be
examined, although this would mostly be to make formalisation simpler and to find a
way to enforce the correct syntax.
A feature of the API that it supports multiple implementations could be exploited to
include different versions of implementations for interoperability with other versions
of the same protocol. In support of such extended implementations, further work could
also include the development of tools to check the API implementations are sound.
There are additional tools that could be added to the LySa Toolkit in Eclipse. We
believe the most interesting additions would be LySa model generation from Alice-Bob
style narration as described in [18, 24]; automatic deduction of crypto-points from a
LySa model; equivalence testing between multiple LySa models and automatic addi-
tion, removal of additional LySa annotations for analysis of LySa models as in [34].
Automated LySa generation would be useful as it would allow a user to generate
a Java implementation based on the typical Alice and Bob narration that is often used
to describe protocols. While the generated LySa would still have to be verified and
validated by tools such as the LySatool and AnaLySa as the specification or translation
may not be correct, the process would be a fast way of generating skeleton code which
could still be checked even after making necessary changes. The challenge in this pro-
cess is that protocol narrations miss out a lot of data as mentioned in Section 2.2.1.
This information has to be inferred from the narrations or provided in supporting ma-
terials to determine what information is known prior to the start of a protocol run and
what actions a recipient of a message undertakes upon receiving a message. Protocol
narrations do not specify whether a message part is checked, assigned to a variable or
decrypted, and if so, with what key. Additionally, information about the deployment
scenario is needed to give greater clarity to the role a principal plays, for example the
name S usually refers to a fixed authentication server which is important information
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if constructing a Meta-LySa model.
Currently the assertions that the crypto-points represent are the only part of the
code which is not a natural part of the implementations. They represent annotations
in a system where we have tried to minimise extra information required to perform
translations. Having crypto-points automatically deduced would mean no assertions
are required in the Java code.
LySa equivalence would be useful to see if a program represents the same LySa
model before and after modification without comparing LySa models or analysis re-
sults by hand. This could additionally be useful for interoperability reasons.
For PAMeLa the most important improvement that can be made is to improve ac-
curacy of the rates generated by the AutoRate tool in Section 4.5. Due to the resources
available it was not possible to gather rates from multiple device types and across dif-
ferent communication mediums. The rates we have provided are based on measuring
the time taken to perform tasks on one computer and then scaling these to other de-
vices using processor chip speed as a guide. However, we have provided a framework
that allows the rates we have provided to be edited by a user. The Eclipse Preferences
option provides a persistent method of storing preferences over multiple workspace
sessions. At any point the user can also choose to revert their options to the default
rates. Figure 8.1 shows the preference page for the AutoRate tool.
8.3 Use Cases
8.3.1 Protocol Designer
One potential user of this series of tools would be a protocol designer. This person is
more familiar with process calculi than programming languages such as Java. They
would be expected to start with an empty LySa file and use the LySa Toolkit in Eclipse
to assist them in creating a LySa model. At the early stage, elements of the LySa Editor
would be of most use, namely features such as syntax highlighting and syntax check-
ing. Once a first draft of the model has been completed, tools such as the AnaLySa
and VisuaLySa can then be used by the designer to examine how the protocol operates,
checking that message parts are being sent correctly and the protocol terminates as ex-
pected. These tools also reveal information about the LySatool results but our protocol
designer is likely to prefer the traditional LySatool results as provided through LyTE.
They will be familiar enough with these results to diagnose any problems and fix them
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Figure 8.1: AutoRate Preferences Page
directly.
If they have a particular deployment scenario in mind they may choose to use
PAMeLa to examine how suitable their new protocol is using the default rates pro-
vided by the tools.
It is also possible they may wish to dabble in implementations and use Hajyle to
generate Java such that can add some basic logging information to check that encryp-
tion and decryption is achieved successfully for the confidential payload. By running
the generated Java program they designer can check that the newly-developed protocol
is live as well as safe.
8.3.2 Software Developer
The software developer is a proficient Java developer who has been tasked with im-
plementing some cryptographic protocol either because nobody in the team has any
experience or because they are working on their own. Having attended a number of
Computer Security lectures as an undergraduate they know enough to know that they
do not know enough to attempt to create their own protocol. Here they have two op-
tions, ideally they find a LySa model of a suitable protocol which they can run through
Hajyle to generate their skeleton Java code. More likely they are forced to look through
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literature to find a protocol they believe is suitable. Once they have identified a po-
tential protocol they are then tasked to try to find enough material to enable them to
implement the protocol, perhaps a basic protocol narration along with a text-based ex-
planation which fills in the gaps in knowledge. For either of these options they perform
a cursory check to see if any attacks have been discovered.
Naturally the implementation process has a few false starts and misunderstandings
but eventually the developer gets a working implementation and uses Elyjah to gen-
erate the LySa representation. They can then use the LySatool to check the security
properties of the protocol. Perhaps the LySatool reports some errors at this point. The
developer then checks whether this is a problem that the original protocol suffers from
by undertaking more focused research. Otherwise they can use the AnaLySa and Vi-
suaLySa tools to check the protocol narration is the same as expected from the original
specification and that they have implemented the protocol successfully.
If changes are needed to be made to the protocol this can either be done on the
LySa model and converted to Java via Hajyle or on the original Java depending on the
developer’s confidence. The advantage with the second option is that the file retains
the extra code needed to connect with the rest of their application which would have
to be reimplemented if using Hajyle. Under either option though the implementation
can be rechecked at any time using Elyjah and the LySatool. Once a secure proto-
col has been implemented, the necessary liveness checks can be made by running the
implementation and examining the output.
It is likely the developer knows the deployment scenario the protocol is intended
for. They can then use Elyjah to generate Meta-LySa for this deployment scenario
and validate that this does not introduce other errors. Additionally PAMela can be
run on the Elyjah-generated LySa and results from actual implementation runs on the
target devices used as rates to give the developer the most accurate PAM model possi-
ble. From this they can choose appropriate encryption and communication algorithms
or network infrastructure improvements to best optimise the protocol’s run-time per-
formance. Once they have settled on these details, service-level agreements can be




We developed a series of tools to assist users unfamiliar with process calculi utilise
the security analysis of the LySatool. With the LySa Editor’s parse checker and ability
to check for matching send/receive processes we have made it easier to write or edit
LySa models and with the AnaLySa and VisuaLySa we provide tools to translate a LySa
process into a simpler model. Integration with the LySatool means users can observe
any potential security breaches in a number of intuitive ways. Attacker’s actions are
visualised and non-confidential message exchanges are highlighted. As a side-effect of
this work we have provided a user of the Elyjah tool with the necessary tools to check
that the LySa output of Elyjah is accurate with respect to the Java implementation.
We believe this is more useful to the users of Elyjah than a theoretical proof of the
correctness of Elyjah which may be hard to understand. Additionally a simple case-
by-case proof is more relevant to the user.
With Elyjah, we tried to provide the functionality of cryptographic model analysis
to a user who had no inclination to learn how to use these formal models. With the
LySa Toolkit in Eclipse the intention was to try to create some tools which appeal to
those who wish to take the next step and have more understanding of the output of
Elyjah and the underlying LySa.
These tools have been used for the last two years in the MSc Language-based Secu-
rity course at DTU where the students were actively encouraged to use LyTE. Feedback
from course organisers was very positive as they noted “It definitely improved students
understanding of how a protocol is modelled with LySa process calculus, and how the
tool implementing the analysis works”[80]. It was reported that students saved time
both in debugging their models and interpreting the analysis results and the plug-in
was declared a “great help”[80] for LySa users.
8.4.2 PAMeLA
It is important for implementers to be able to make sure that they choose an appropriate
protocol for their deployment scenario. For protocol developers it is equally important
that their design is not so flawed as to include unnecessary performance bottlenecks.
PAMeLa allows protocol developers to utilise powerful performance analysis without
needing any knowledge of the underlying mechanics or language. With the aid of the
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AutoRate plug-in appropriate rates are automatically calculated based on a user’s se-
lected deployment scenario, eliminating a difficult aspect of performance modelling.
With these tools, network administrators can work out the best way of improving the
performance of their network thus potentially saving time and money instead of acci-
dentally devoting resources to areas which would not improve performance.
With the passage-time analysis available, users can provide service-level agree-
ments giving reasonable estimates as to when a protocol will terminate. Combined with
then generating implementations using Hajyle and using rates by using final implemen-
tations of JaLAPI they will also then be able to use these service-level agreements to
potentially spot message exchanges which fall outside of expected range which may
indicate an attempted attack.
8.4.3 Elyjah and Hajyle
Elyjah translates a Java implementation of a cryptographic protocol into a formal
model. Such a process can only be reliably achieved using automation. The LySa
model can be analysed using the LySatool to return the security properties of the pro-
tocol implementation. The examples given in Chapters 5 and 6 are necessarily brief
so that enough detail could be given to the explanation. In practice, Elyjah and Ha-
jyle have been used to translate protocols such as the Yahalom[22], Otway-Rees[62]
and Needham-Schroeder[53] protocols. These implementations have then been used
as part of small applications such as secure instant-messaging. The intent is to allow
these implementations to be used on Java2 ME or Android devices such as mobile
phones where there is a market for secure communication and authentication.
Several library classes are provided to allow a developer to develop a protocol.
Elyjah has been designed so that it can be used in a real program by replacing the
implementation of the Network class. While Elyjah cannot necessarily analyse the
source code of an arbitrary communications package, it is possible to implement a
protocol that can be translated by Elyjah and used in a full distributed application.
Hajyle allows those developers already familiar with LySa to generate implemen-
tations based on LySa models. This tool also allows continued development once a
user has generated a LySa model using Elyjah. Using tools such as those detailed in
Chapter 3 helps a user to work with the generated LySa model and create an updated
Java implementation once any changes have been made.
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8.4.4 General Conclusions
In Chapter 1 we defined verification and validation of programs as making the program
right and making the right program respectively. By converting Java implementations
into LySa models we can verify the security properties of the protocol. Using the tools
in the LySa Toolkit the user is presented with clear visualisations of the protocol to
validate that the protocol they implemented will function as they intended. Addition-
ally the performance analysis provided through PAMeLa provides additional quality
assurance with respect to system usability that is integral to making the right program.
Over the course of developing these tools it has been made clear that excellent for-
mal methods are available for analysing security in applications that are not being used
by developers at large. This is partly due to the shortage of available literature regard-
ing these methods targeted towards complete novices in process calculi. Additionally
while many universities offer courses on these topics they are optional so a graduate
may not have been exposed to them. With little information available at present for or-
dinary developers, further development of the sort of tools developed here could really
help to introduce more people to these formal methods.
A quote attributed to Tom Melham states that “Formal methods will never have a
significant impact until they can be used by people that don’t understand them”. Tools
like the ones presented in this dissertation are examples of how we can make real
progress towards this goal.

Bibliography
[1] Martı́n Abadi and Andrew D. Gordon. A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols:
The Spi Calculus. In Fourth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 36–47. ACM Press, 1997.
[2] M. Ajmone Marsan, G. Balbo, G. Conte, S. Donatelli, and G. Franceschinis.
Modelling with Generalised Stochastic Petri Nets. John Wiley and Sons, 1995.
[3] Ross J. Anderson and Ross Anderson. Security Engineering: A Guide to Building
Dependable Distributed Systems. Wiley, January 2001.
[4] David Aspinall, Stephen Gilmore, Martin Hofmann, Donald Sannella, and Ian
Stark. Mobile Resource Guarantees for Smart Devices. In Proceedings of CAS-
SIS04, LNCS, pages 1–26. Springer, 2005.
[5] Michael Backes, Catalin Hritcu, and Matteo Maffei. Automated Verification of
Remote Electronic Voting Protocols in the Applied Pi-Calculus. In CSF ’08:
Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium,
pages 195–209. IEEE Computer Society, 2008.
[6] Michael J. Beller, Li-Fung Chang, and Yacov Yacobi. Privacy and Authentica-
tion on a Portable Communications System. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, 11(6):821–829, 1993.
[7] Jesper Bengtson, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Cédric Fournet, Andrew D. Gordon,
and Sergio Maffeis. Refinement Types for Secure Implementations. In Computer
Security Foundations Symposium, pages 17–32, 2008.
[8] Marco Bernardo, Lorenzo Donatiello, and Roberto Gorrieri. A formal approach
to the integration of performance aspects in the modeling and analysis of concur-
rent systems. Information and Computation, 144(2):83 – 154, 1998.
137
138 Bibliography
[9] Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Cedric Fournet, Andrew D. Gordon, and Stephen Tse.
Verified Interoperable Implementations of Security Protocols. Proceedings of the
Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2006:139 – 152, 2006.
[10] Bruno Blanchet. An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Pro-
log Rules. In 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-14),
pages 82–96, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 2001. IEEE Computer
Society.
[11] C. Bodei, M. Buchholtz, P. Degano, F. Nielson, and H. Nielson. Automatic vali-
dation of protocol narration. Proceedings of 16th IEEE Computer Security Foun-
dations Workshop (CSFW 16), pages 126–140, 2003.
[12] C. Bodei, M. Buchholtz, P. Degano, H. Riis Nielson, and F. Nielson. Static
Validation of Security Protocols. Journal of Computer Security, 13(3):347–390,
2005.
[13] Chiara Bodei, Linda Brodo, Pierpaolo Degano, and Han Gao. Detecting and
Preventing Type Flaws at Static Time. J. Comput. Secur., 18(2):229–264, 2010.
[14] Chiara Bodei, Mikael Buchholtz, Pierpaolo Degano, Flemming Nielson, and
Hanne Riis Nielson. Control Flow Analysis Can Find New Flaws Too. Pro-
ceedings of Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS 04), 2004.
[15] Chiara Bodei, Michele Curti, Pierpaolo Degano, Mikael Buchholtz, Flemming
Nielson, Hanne Riis Nielson, and Corrado Priami. Performance Evaluation of
Security Protocols Specified in LySa. Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., 112:167–
189, 2005.
[16] G. Bolch, S. Greiner, H. de Meer, and K. Trivedi. Queueing Networks and
Markov Chains. Wiley, 2006.
[17] Jeremy T. Bradley, Nicholas J. Dingle, Stephen T. Gilmore, and William J. Knot-
tenbelt. Extracting Passage Times from PEPA models with the HYDRA Tool:
A Case Study. In UKPEW 2003, 19th UK Performance Engineering Workshop,
pages 79–90, June 2003.
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